End-to-End Enforcement of Erasure and Declassification by Chong, Stephen & Myers, Andrew C.
End-to-End Enforcement of Erasure and Declassification
Stephen Chong Andrew C. Myers
Department of Computer Science
Cornell University
{schong,andru}@cs.cornell.edu
Computing and Information Science Technical Report
http://hdl.handle.net/1813/10504
April 2007
Revised June 2008
End-to-End Enforcement of Erasure and Declassification
Stephen Chong Andrew C. Myers
Department of Computer Science
Cornell University
{schong,andru}@cs.cornell.edu
Abstract
Declassification occurs when the confidentiality of informa-
tion is weakened; erasure occurs when the confidentiality
of information is strengthened, perhaps to the point of com-
pletely removing the information from the system.
This paper shows how to enforce erasure and declassifica-
tion policies. A combination of a type system that controls
information flow and a simple runtime mechanism to over-
write data ensures end-to-end enforcement of policies. We
prove that well-typed programs satisfy the semantic security
condition noninterference according to policy.
We extend the Jif programming language with erasure and
declassification enforcement mechanisms and use the result-
ing language in a large case study of a voting system.
1 Introduction
Enforcing information security is an important requirement
of many systems. However, often information security
changes over time, complicating enforcement. Declassifica-
tion and erasure are two common ways in which the security
enforced on information changes. Declassification occurs
when the confidentiality enforced on information is weak-
ened, for example, by allowing more people to read the infor-
mation. Erasure [2] is the opposite phenomenon, occurring
when the confidentiality enforced on information is strength-
ened, perhaps to the point of removing the information from
the system entirely.
Much work in recent years has considered how to provide
end-to-end enforcement of declassification requirements.
(See Sabelfeld and Sands [21] for a recent survey.) Compar-
atively little work [11] has considered end-to-end enforce-
ment of erasure requirements, and none has considered both
declassification and erasure together. In this paper, we en-
force both erasure and declassification requirements end-to-
end in a language-based setting. The erasure policies we en-
force are significantly more expressive than any previously
enforced.
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Consider, as an example of erasure requirements, a med-
ical information website. The website offers (among other
functionality) a diagnostic application, where a user may
enter information about symptoms, and the application will
present information about possible diseases consistent with
the symptoms. The website’s privacy policy states that
symptoms the user enters are private, and no record of them
will be kept after the user has finished using the diagnostic
application. The provider of this website needs to enforce
an erasure requirement: when the user has finished using the
diagnostic application, the symptom data that the user has
entered must be erased. Note that the information the user
has entered may need to persist over several user requests,
but also might need to be erased before the session has fin-
ished. Thus, the lifetime of the information does not neces-
sarily match that of any web server resource. Another sub-
tlety is that the diagnoses the system has produced must also
be erased, as the diagnoses may reveal information about the
symptoms entered.
Information security is an end-to-end requirement: infor-
mation security policies must be enforced on information no
matter how it propagates through the system or where it en-
ters or leaves. These policies should also be enforced on
data derived from sensitive information, since derived data
may allow deductions about source information. In the diag-
nostic application described above, learning diagnoses may
reveal symptoms, which are sensitive.
Information-flow control is an approach for achieving end-
to-end enforcement. Information-flow control techniques
enforce security by restricting the flow, or propagation, of in-
formation in a system. Conceptually, information-flow con-
trol techniques label data with security levels; as data are
updated and created, the security labels are also updated to
reflect data dependencies. The security labels can be used to
prevent confidential data from being output on public chan-
nels. Static enforcement methods [20] can control informa-
tion flow without incurring the performance overheads of
representing security labels at runtime.
In this paper, we use static information-flow control to en-
force erasure and declassification requirements end-to-end.
Erasure and declassification requirements are specified in a
policy language that can express when information may be
declassified, and when information must be erased. Section 2
reviews this policy language, which was introduced in earlier
work [2] but lacked any enforcement mechanism.
1
a, b Conditions
p, q ::= Policies
` Lattice policy
p↘a q Declassification policy
p a↗q Erasure policy
Figure 1: Syntax of policies
Section 3 presents a simple imperative language that has
a runtime mechanism for overwriting memory locations. A
type system controls information flow, ensuring that infor-
mation that needs to be erased is placed only in memory lo-
cations that will be overwritten at appropriate times.
Noninterference [6] is an end-to-end semantic security
condition. It is well-known that noninterference is too
strong in the presence of declassification, which intention-
ally makes sensitive information public. However, nonin-
terference is too weak in the presence of erasure—it cannot
express erasure requirements, which restrict observation of
public information. Section 4 proves that well-typed pro-
grams satisfy noninterference according to policy [2], a gen-
eralization of noninterference that precisely expresses the in-
formation flows permitted by declassification and erasure.
Section 5 describes how we incorporated declassification
and erasure policies into the decentralized label model [16]
and extended the Jif programming language [17] with the
new label model. We have used this extended version of Jif
to implement a large, security-intensive system: Civitas [3],
a secure voting service. Section 6 describes how the policies
are useful in its implementation. Section 7 reviews related
work, and Section 8 concludes.
2 Policies
The declassification and erasure policy framework intro-
duced in previous work [2] assumes there is a lattice (L,v)
of confidentiality levels, and a language for specifying con-
ditions, which indicate when declassification may occur and
when erasure must occur. To instantiate the policy frame-
work, lattice L and the condition language must be speci-
fied. Appropriate security lattices include the two-point lat-
tice {L,H} where L v H and H 6v L, and the lattice
of security principals ordered by an acts-for relation [16].
(In Section 5 we use the lattice of security principals when
extending the decentralized label model [16].) We assume
there is a clear notion of enforcement of confidentiality level
` ∈ L on information. Many condition languages are possi-
ble; Section 3 uses program expressions as conditions.
2.1 Syntax
Security policies describe what confidentiality level is cur-
rently enforced on information, and how this may and must
change in the future. Figure 1 shows the syntax of policies.
Lattice policy ` ∈ Lmeans that the confidentiality level ` (or
a more restrictive confidentiality level) must be enforced on
information now and at all times in the future. Declassifica-
tion policy p↘a q means that policy p is currently enforced on
information, and when condition a is satisfied, information
may be declassified, after which policy q must be enforced
(regardless of the subsequent satisfaction or non-satisfaction
of a). Erasure policy p a↗q means that policy p is currently
enforced on information, and when condition a is satisfied,
information must be made more restricted, by enforcing both
policies p and q on the information (regardless of the subse-
quent satisfaction or non-satisfaction of a).
The satisfaction of conditions controls when declassifica-
tion may occur, and when erasure must occur. Condition
satisfaction is specific to the condition language used. We
assume condition satisfaction depends only on the current
system state s (which may include the history of the sys-
tem), and write s  a if condition a is satisfied in state s, and
s 2 a if a is not satisfied in state s.
For example, if we are enforcing policy H↘aL on in-
formation, then we must enforce the confidentiality level H
on the information; however, when condition a is satisfied,
we are permitted to change the confidentiality level enforced
on the information to L. If we are enforcing erasure policy
L a↗H on information, then we must enforce the confiden-
tiality level L on the information, and if and when condition
a is satisfied, we must change the confidentiality level we are
enforcing to be at least as restrictive as both L and H—since
L v H , it suffices to enforce the confidentiality level H .
Consider enforcing policy (H↘aL) b↗H on information.
Initially policy H↘aL is enforced on information, meaning
that the confidentiality level H must be enforced, and if con-
dition a is satisfied (before b is satisfied) then confidentiality
level L can be enforced on information. However, once con-
dition b is satisfied, we must enforce policy H on informa-
tion, meaning that confidentiality level H will be enforced
then and at all times in the future.
To see how these policies can capture the security require-
ments of applications, let us revisit the medical information
website example from the introduction. A suitable policy for
symptoms entered by the user could be session appEnd↗>,
where session is a confidentiality level allowing only the
session client and server to read the information, > is a con-
fidentiality level so restrictive that it prevents the server from
storing the information, and appEnd is a condition that is
satisfied when the user has finished using the diagnosis appli-
cation. Thus, the data entered by the user will initially have
the confidentiality level session enforced on it. Once condi-
tion appEnd is satisfied, the confidentiality level > must be
enforced, implying that the data will be removed completely
from the system. End-to-end enforcement of the policies will
ensure that information derived from the user’s symptoms
will have the same policy, session appEnd↗> enforced on it,
or something more restrictive. Thus, any diagnoses derived
from the user’s symptoms must also have the confidentiality
level > enforced on them once appEnd is satisfied.
Condition satisfaction determines when policies mandate
erasure. Since condition satisfaction is determined solely by
the system state, we say that policy p requires information
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reqErase(p, s)
reqErase(p↘ap′, s)
reqErase(p, s) or s  a
reqErase(p a↗p′, s)
Figure 2: Definition of reqErase(p, s)
erasure in state s (or simply, requires erasure in state s),
denoted reqErase(p, s), if there is a currently enforced era-
sure policy whose condition is satisfied. Figure 2 gives in-
ference rules defining reqErase(p, s). Lattice policy ` never
requires erasure. Declassification policy p↘a q requires era-
sure if subpolicy p (the policy currently enforced) requires
erasure. Erasure policy p a↗q requires erasure if subpolicy
p requires erasure, or a is satisfied. If policy p is enforced
on information, then we must ensure that in any state s such
that p requires erasure in s, the information either is removed
from the system, or has a suitably restrictive policy enforced
on it.
2.2 Semantics
Intuitively, the policies describe how the confidentiality of
information may and must change as the system executes.
We formalize this intuition by providing a semantics for poli-
cies.
The semantics of policy p in state s, denoted [[p]]s, is a
set of pairs of system states and confidentiality levels that
describes what confidentiality levels may be enforced on in-
formation labeled p in state s as the system evolves from
state s. If policy p is enforced on information in state s, and
(s′, `′) ∈ [[p]]s, then by the time the system reaches state s′
(in zero or more steps), confidentiality level `′ may be en-
forced on the information.
[[`]]s = {(s′, `′) | s→∗ s′ and ` v `′}
[[p↘a q]]s = [[p]]s ∪
⋃
{[[q]]s′ | s→∗ s′ and s′  a}
[[p a↗q]]s = [[p]]s ∩
(
{(s′, `) ∈ [[p]]s | [s, s′] 2 a} ∪⋃
{[[q]]s′′ | s→∗ s′′ and [s, s′′) 2 a}
)
Figure 3: Semantics for policies [[p]]s
Figure 3 defines the semantics [[p]]s. We assume that the
relation→ over system states describes atomic transitions of
the system, and denote the reflexive transitive closure of this
relation as→∗.
The semantics for confidentiality level ` allow any confi-
dentiality level at least as restrictive as ` to be enforced at all
times in the future.
The semantics of declassification policy p↘a q is a super-
set of the semantics of policy p. The semantics capture the
intuition that when the condition is satisfied, the informa-
tion may be declassified, and after declassification, policy q
is enforced on the declassified information. If p permits en-
forcing confidentiality ` in state s′, then p↘a q also permits
it, and in addition, permits policy q to be enforced on infor-
mation, starting in any state s′ such that s′  a.
By contrast, the semantics of erasure policy p a↗q in state
s is a subset of the semantics of p in s. The intuition is
that policy p is enforced while condition a is not satisfied,
and once condition a is satisfied, the information is made
more restricted by enforcing both policies p and q. We write
[s, s′] 2 a, where s →∗ s′, to mean that condition a is not
satisfied in any state from s to s′ inclusive:
[s, s′] 2 a , ∀s′′. (s→∗ s′′ ∧ s′′ →∗ s′)⇒ s′′ 2 a.
Similarly, we use [s, s′) 2 a, to mean that condition a is not
satisfied in any state from s up to but not including, state s′:
[s, s′) 2 a ,
∀s′′. (s→∗ s′′ ∧ s′′ →∗ s′ ∧ s′′ 6= s′)⇒ s′′ 2 a.
2.3 Relabeling judgment
We can define a relabeling judgment a0, . . . , ak ` p ≤ q
such that if a0, . . . , ak ` p ≤ q then, assuming conditions
a0, . . . , ak are all satisfied, information labeled with policy
p can safely be relabeled with policy q. That is, enforcing
q on the information is consistent with policy p. Any such
relabeling judgment should be sound with respect to the se-
mantics, and we require the following property to hold.
Property 1 (Soundness) If a0, . . . , ak ` p ≤ q then for all
states s, such that ∀i ∈ 0..k. s  ai, we have [[q]]s ⊆ [[p]]s.
A sound relabeling judgment serves as a syntactic approx-
imation of the policy semantics. Inference rules for a re-
labeling judgment, and a proof of soundness, are given in
Appendix A. In the following section, we use the relabeling
judgment in the type system to enforce policies syntactically,
without reference to policy semantics.
Other sound syntactic approximations of the policy se-
mantics are possible. In earlier work [2] we introduced a
sound relabeling relation parameterized on the current state
of the system. This permits reasoning about the subsequent
execution of the system, in addition to the conditions satis-
fied in the current system state.
3 Language
In this section we present a simple imperative language,
IMPE , that incorporates declassification and erasure poli-
cies. The language has runtime mechanisms for erasure and
declassification, and a type system to control the flow of in-
formation. In Section 4, we show that these together suffice
to enforce declassification and erasure policies.
3.1 Syntax
Figure 4 presents the syntax of IMPE . We assume there is
a countable set of variables Vars . Language expressions in-
clude integer literals n ∈ Z, and variables x ∈ Vars . The
metavariable ⊕ ranges over total binary operations on inte-
gers.
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e ::= Expressions
n Integer literal
x Variable
e0 ⊕ e1 Binary operation
c ::= Commands
skip No-op
x := e Assignment
c0; c1 Sequence
if e then c0 else c1 Selection
while e do c Iteration
x := declassify(e, pf to pt using e0, . . . , ek)
Guarded declassification
Figure 4: Syntax of IMPE
Conditions of policies in IMPE are simply expressions. A
condition is satisfied when it evaluates to a non-zero value.
For example, if policy H↘x+3L is enforced on information,
that information may be declassified when expression x+ 3
is non-zero.
The commands are standard, with the exception of de-
classification. The guarded declassification command x :=
declassify(e, pf to pt using e0, . . . , ek) evaluates expression
e, and assigns the result to variable x, provided that expres-
sion ei evaluates to a non-zero value, for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k. If
there is some ei that evaluates to zero, declassification fails.
The expressions ei are conditions that must be satisfied for
the declassification to occur. The guarded declassification
command allows the type system to check that, assuming all
conditions ei are satisfied, information labeled pf can safely
be relabeled pt , and allows the operational semantics to en-
sure that conditions ei are indeed satisfied when declassi-
fication occurs. The type system and runtime mechanisms
for enforcing declassification are discussed further in Sec-
tions 3.2 and 3.3.
3.2 Operational semantics
A memory σ is a map from variables to integers, and is thus
a function from Vars to Z. We write σ(e) for the result of
evaluating expression e using memory σ, that is, using σ(x)
as the value of each variable x that occurs in e. We write
σ[x 7→ v] for the memory that maps variable x to integer v,
and otherwise behaves exactly as σ does.
A configuration is a pair of a command c and mem-
ory σ, written 〈c, σ〉. A configuration fully describes the
system state. Since policy conditions are expressions, the
satisfaction of a condition depends only on the memory
of the current configuration. For brevity, we thus write
reqErase(p, σ) instead of reqErase(p, 〈c, σ〉).
We assume there is a typing context that indicates what
policy should be enforced on information stored in each vari-
able. A typing context Γ is a function from Vars to policies,
and Γ(x) is the policy that must be enforced on information
stored in variable x. The typing context does not change dur-
ing execution: a variable x always has the same policy Γ(x)
update(σ, x, v) ={
erasure(σ) if reqErase(Γ(x), σ)
erasure(σ[x 7→ v]) otherwise
and
erasure(σ) =
⊔
i∈ω
σi
where σ0 = σ, and
σi+1 = λx ∈ Vars.
{
0 if reqErase(Γ(x), σi)
σi(x) otherwise
and
⊔
i∈ω σi denotes the least upper bound of the chain
σ0σ1σ2 . . . under the ordering v, where
σ′ v σ′′ , ∀x ∈ Vars. σ′(x) = σ′′(x) ∨ σ′′(x) = 0
Figure 6: update(σ, x, v) and erasure(σ)
enforced on it.
Figure 5 presents the operational semantics for IMPE ,
showing how configurations are updated as commands ex-
ecute. The enforcement of policies relies on two runtime
mechanisms, embodied in the operational semantics. The
first is runtime overwriting of variables to enforce erasure;
the second is runtime checking of conditions for declassifi-
cation. Except for these two mechanisms, the operational
semantics of the language are standard.
Overwriting variables. IMPE enforces erasure by setting
the contents of a variable to zero whenever the policy for the
variable requires information erasure. Policy p requires in-
formation erasure when reqErase(p, σ) holds, where σ is
the current memory. For example, policies L x≥0↗H and
(L x=3↗H)↘yL both require information erasure if σ(x) =
3. Since conditions are expressions, a condition may be-
come satisfied when the memory is updated. The operational
semantics for commands that update memory (assignment
and declassification) use the utility function update(σ, x, v)
to overwrite variables, defined in Figure 6. The function
update(σ, x, v) takes memory σ, variable x, and integer v,
and, provided policy Γ(x) does not require erasure, returns
erasure(σ[x 7→ v]). The utility function erasure(σ) checks
for each variable y if policy Γ(y) requires erasure given the
memory σ; if so, it overwrites variable y with the value zero.
Overwriting y changes the memory, and thus may trigger the
overwriting of other variables.
The function erasure(σ) is defined for all memories σ,
and it provably overwrites variables as required: if σ′ =
erasure(σ) then for all variables x, reqErase(Γ(x), σ′) im-
plies σ′(x) = 0.
Runtime mechanism for declassification. Declassifica-
tion of information can occur only when appropriate con-
ditions are satisfied. For example, policy H↘x>0L allows
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OS-SKIP
〈skip; c, σ〉 → 〈c, σ〉
OS-ASSIGN
σ′ = update(σ, x, σ(e))
〈x := e, σ〉 → 〈skip, σ′〉
OS-SEQUENCE
〈c0, σ〉 → 〈c′0, σ′〉
〈c0; c1, σ〉 → 〈c′0; c1, σ′〉
OS-IF
i =
{
0 if σ(e) 6= 0
1 if σ(e) = 0
〈if e then c0 else c1, σ〉 → 〈ci, σ〉
OS-WHILE
〈while e do c, σ〉 → 〈if e then c; while e do c else skip, σ〉
OS-DECLASSIFY
v =
{
σ(e) if ∀i ∈ 0..k. σ(ei) 6= 0
0 if ∃i ∈ 0..k. σ(ei) = 0
σ′ = update(σ, x, v)
〈x := declassify(e, pf to pt using e0, . . . , ek), σ〉 → 〈skip, σ′〉
Figure 5: Operational semantics of IMPE
information to be declassified to L when the expression
x > 0 is non-zero, that is, when x is positive. The oper-
ational semantics for a guarded declassification command,
x := declassify(e, pf to pt using e0, . . . , ek), evaluates
e and assigns the result to variable x provided the expres-
sions e0, . . . , ek all evaluate to non-zero values. If one or
more expressions ei evaluate to zero, then declassification
fails, and variable x is updated with the constant value zero.
(Other reasonable semantics include leaving the value of x
unchanged, or stopping execution.)
For example, if the policy H↘bar>0L is enforced on vari-
able foo, then the command
quux := declassify(foo, H↘bar>0L to L using bar > 0)
will successfully declassify the contents of foo only if the
expression bar > 0 evaluates to a non-zero value.
The use of runtime mechanisms to aid in the enforce-
ment of declassification and erasure policies allows simpler
static enforcement mechanisms. The policies can be en-
forced without these runtime mechanisms, but would require
either more complex static enforcement, or less expressive
conditions. See Section 7 for more discussion on this trade-
off.
3.3 Type system
The runtime mechanisms of IMPE ensure that declassifica-
tion only occurs if appropriate conditions are satisfied, and
that variables are overwritten when their policies require era-
sure. However, the runtime mechanisms alone are not suffi-
cient to ensure that erasure and declassification policies are
enforced. What prevents information with erasure policy
L a↗H from being stored in a variable x that has policy L
enforced on it? Information in variable x has low security en-
forced on it, and is not necessarily overwritten when condi-
tion a is satisfied. Similarly, what prevents information with
policy H from being stored in a variable with policy H↘aL
enforced on it, and then subsequently (and incorrectly) being
declassified?
The type system of IMPE restricts information flow within
a program, ensuring that appropriate policies are enforced
on information at all times. The type system restricts both
explicit flows, where information flows from direct assign-
ments to variables, and implicit flows [4], where information
flows via the program’s control structure. The type system
does not restrict timing or termination channels.
The typing judgment pc,Γ ` c com means that command
c is well-typed under typing context Γ and program counter
policy pc. The program counter policy is used to restrict
implicit flows. It is an upper bound on the policies of infor-
mation that may have influenced the value of the program
counter, and so is an upper bound on the information that
may be gained by knowing that command c is executed. The
typing judgment Γ ` e : p exp means that under typing
context Γ, policy p is an upper bound on the policies of in-
formation that may be gained by evaluating expression e.
Figure 7 presents inference rules for these typing judg-
ments. The rules track and restrict the flow of information
within a program. For example, the rule T-ASSIGN for an
assignment x := e ensures that information that may be re-
vealed by evaluating expression e is allowed to flow to vari-
able x (` pe ≤ Γ(x)), and that information that may be re-
vealed by learning the assignment is executed is also allowed
to flow to variable x (` pc ≤ Γ(x)).
All the inference rules for the judgments pc,Γ ` c com
and Γ ` e : p exp are standard for information-flow
security type systems, with the exception of the rule for
guarded declassification, T-DECLASSIFY. A guarded de-
classification command x := declassify(e, pf to pt using
e0, . . . , ek) declassifies information with policy pf to policy
pt . Rule T-DECLASSIFY requires that pf can be relabeled
pt assuming conditions conditions e0, . . . , ek are satisfied
(e0, . . . , ek ` pf ≤ pt ). Rule T-DECLASSIFY also requires
that the declassified information is allowed to be stored in x
(` pt ≤ Γ(x)), that the information gained by knowing the
declassification occurred can flow to x (` pc ≤ Γ(x)), and
that the information gained by evaluating e is bounded above
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T-SKIP
Γ ` pc pol
pc,Γ ` skip com
T-ASSIGN
Γ ` e : Γ(x) exp ` pc ≤ Γ(x) Γ ` pc pol
pc,Γ ` x := e com
T-SEQUENCE
pc,Γ ` c0 com pc,Γ ` c1 com
pc,Γ ` c0; c1 com
T-IF
Γ ` e : pe exp pc′,Γ ` c0 com pc′,Γ ` c1 com
` pc ≤ pc′ ` pe ≤ pc′ Γ ` pc pol
pc,Γ ` if e then c0 else c1 com
T-WHILE
Γ ` e : pe exp pc′,Γ ` c com
Γ ` pc pol ` pc ≤ pc′ ` pe ≤ pc′
pc,Γ ` while e do c com
T-DECLASSIFY
Γ ` e : pf exp ` pc ≤ Γ(x) ` pt ≤ Γ(x) Γ ` pc pol
∀i ∈ 0..k. Γ ` ei : Γ(x) exp e0, . . . , ek ` pf ≤ pt
pc,Γ ` x := declassify(e, pf to pt using e0, . . . , ek) com
T-VAL
Γ ` n : p exp
T-VAR
` Γ(x) ≤ p
Γ ` x : p exp
T-OP
Γ ` e0 : p0 exp Γ ` e1 : p1 exp
` p0 ≤ p ` p1 ≤ p
Γ ` e0 ⊕ e1 : p exp
T-POL
∀e ∈ eraseConds(p). Γ ` e : p exp
Γ ` p pol
eraseConds(`) , ∅
eraseConds(p↘a q) , eraseConds(p)
eraseConds(p a↗q) , {a} ∪ eraseConds(p)
Figure 7: Inference rules for typing judgments pc,Γ ` c com, Γ ` e : p exp, and Γ ` p pol
by policy pf (Γ ` e : pf exp).
There is a flow of information from the conditions
e0, . . . , ek to the variable x. The operational semantics for
a guarded declassification will assign the result of evaluating
e into x only if all conditions e0, . . . , ek evaluate to non-zero
values. Thus, the value of the variable x after the declas-
sification command may reveal information about the value
of the conditions. The typing rule for declassification, T-
DECLASSIFY, tracks this information flow by requiring Γ(x)
to be an upper bound on the information that may be gained
by knowing if condition ei was satisfied (Γ ` ei : Γ(x) exp).
3.3.1 Well-formed contexts
A variable x is overwritten when Γ(x), the policy enforced
on x, requires erasure. Thus, if satisfaction of condition e
can cause policy Γ(x) to require erasure, there is information
flow from e to x. To track and control this information flow,
we restrict the typing contexts that may be used.
For all variables x, we require that policy Γ(x) is well-
typed, written Γ ` Γ(x) pol. Any policy that is used as a
program counter policy in the proof of a typing judgment
pc,Γ ` c com must also be well-typed. The inference rule
for well-typed policies is given in Figure 7. It requires that if
condition e may cause policy p to require erasure, then p is
an upper bound on the information that may be obtained by
evaluating e (Γ ` e : p exp).
The recursively defined function eraseConds(p) returns
the set of expressions that may cause policy p to require era-
sure. That is, reqErase(p, σ) if and only if there is some
condition e ∈ eraseConds(p) such that σ(e) 6= 0.
In addition, typing contexts are restricted to prevent infi-
nite chains of variables x0, x1, . . . , such that the overwriting
of variable xi depends on the value of variable xi+1. For
example, this restriction prevents a variable x having policy
L x=0↗H . This restriction makes it easier to track informa-
tion flows that occur due to overwriting, and simplifies both
security proofs and implementation of variable overwriting.
We define the overwrite dependency relation ≺Γ over vari-
ables such that x ≺Γ y if changing the value of x may cause
policy Γ(y) to require erasure. More formally, x ≺Γ y if
there is an expression e such that e ∈ eraseConds(Γ(y))
and x appears in e.
Definition 1 (Well-formed typing context) Typing context
Γ is well-formed if the overwrite dependency relation ≺Γ
is well-founded and for all x ∈ Vars , Γ ` Γ(x) pol.
3.4 Example
Figure 8 shows a fragment of IMPE code that could be used
to process a client request to the medical information website
described in the introduction. For ease of presentation, we
assume the existence of functions and strings.
The code first checks if the user has requested to exit the
diagnosis application, and if so, sets variable appEnd and
exits. Otherwise, the code gets the user’s symptoms and uses
them to produce a diagnosis, which would then be displayed
to the user. Modulo the use of strings and functions, the code
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1 if ( userReqExit ) then
2 appEnd = 1; exit()
3 else
4 // get user’s symptoms
5 symp := getUserSymptoms();
6 ...
7 // diagnosis
8 if (contains(symp, ‘malaise’) &&
9 contains(symp, ‘fever’) && ...)
10 then diag := ‘Influenza’
11 else if ...
Γ(symp) = session appEnd↗> Γ(appEnd) = session
Γ(diag) = session appEnd↗> Γ(userReqExit) = session
Figure 8: Medical information website example
is well-typed, and the relevant parts of the typing context Γ
are also shown in Figure 8.
The policy enforced on the user symptoms, Γ(symp), is
session appEnd↗>. As described in Section 2, session is
a confidentiality level allowing only the session client and
server to read the information, and> is a confidentiality level
so restrictive that it prevents the server from storing the infor-
mation. There is an implicit flow of information from symp
to diag, as symp is used in the conditional test on lines 8–9,
and diag is assigned to in the body of the conditional. By
typing rule T-IF, the program counter policy for the condi-
tional’s body must be at least as restrictive as Γ(symp). Sim-
ilarly, by rule T-ASSIGN, Γ(diag) must be as restrictive as
that program counter policy. These constraints are satisfied
by using policy Γ(symp) as the program counter policy for
the body of the conditional, since Γ(symp) = Γ(diag).
The value of variable appEnd can cause policy
session appEnd↗> to require erasure. Indeed, when variable
appEnd is set (line 2), variables symp and diag are overwrit-
ten. There is thus information flow from appEnd to symp
and diag. The requirement for a well-formed typing context
tracks this flow, and requires that ` Γ(appEnd) ≤ Γ(symp)
and ` Γ(appEnd) ≤ Γ(diag), which are satisfied, as
Γ(appEnd) = session,
Γ(symp) = Γ(diag) = session appEnd↗>,
and
` session ≤ session appEnd↗>.
4 Security
The type system and runtime mechanisms of IMPE correctly
enforce the security policies of Section 2.
4.1 Noninterference
Noninterference [6] is a well-known end-to-end semantic se-
curity condition which requires that secret inputs do not in-
fluence public outputs. A formal statement of noninterfer-
ence depends on the definitions of secret input and public
output. In this paper, we consider the secret input to be the
contents of a single variable at the start of program execution,
and the public output to be the values of some subset of vari-
ables during execution. To state noninterference formally,
we define notions of observational equivalence of configura-
tions, execution traces, and correspondences between traces.
The observation level of variable x is determined by the
policy Γ(x) enforced on information stored in x. For policy
p, obs(p) ∈ L is the confidentiality level that is currently
enforced on information labeled p, defined in Figure 9. The
observation level of variable x is obs(Γ(x)). Note that the
observation level of a variable does not change during exe-
cution. The intuition is that a user with security clearance `
is only able to see the contents of variables with an obser-
vation level bounded above by `. For example, if variable
x has policy (H↘aL) b↗H enforced on it, the observation
level of x is H , and a user with clearance L could not ob-
serve the contents of x. The policy (H↘aL) b↗H describes
how the confidentiality of information stored in x may and
must change as conditions are satisfied, but does not change
the observability of the variable itself.
obs(`) , `
obs(p↘a q) , obs(p)
obs(p a↗q) , obs(p)
Figure 9: Observation level
Two configurations 〈c, σ〉 and 〈c′, σ′〉 are observation-
ally equivalent at level `, written 〈c, σ〉 ≈` 〈c′, σ′〉, if
all variables that are observable at level ` have the same
value in both memories. Observational equivalence is im-
plicitly parameterized on the typing context Γ. More for-
mally, 〈c, σ〉 ≈` 〈c′, σ′〉 if and only if for all x ∈ Vars ,
if obs(Γ(x)) v ` then σ(x) = σ′(x). Intuitively, if
〈c, σ〉 ≈` 〈c′, σ′〉, then a user with security clearance ` is
unable to distinguish these two configurations by examining
the contents of the memory. However, a user may be able
to distinguish two executions of the program starting from
〈c, σ〉 and 〈c′, σ′〉, by observing the sequences of config-
urations that each execution produces. This motivates the
definition of traces, and correspondences between traces.
A trace τ is a (finite or infinite) sequence of configurations
τ = 〈c0, σ0〉〈c1, σ1〉 . . . such that 〈ci−1, σi−1〉 → 〈ci, σi〉
for all i ∈ N such that 0 < i < |τ |, where |τ | denotes the
length of trace τ . We write τ [i] to refer to the ith configura-
tion in the trace τ .
We use correspondences [1] between traces to indicate
which states appear equivalent to an observer that sees first
one trace, then the other. A correspondence R is a relation
over the natural numbers. If R is a correspondence for traces
τ1 and τ2, and (i, j) ∈ R, we will use it to mean that τ1[i]
and τ2[j] look the same to a given observer. Formally, a cor-
respondence R between traces τ1 and τ2 is a subset of N×N
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such that
1. (Completeness) either {i | (i, j) ∈ R} = {i ∈ N | i <
|τ |} or {j | (i, j) ∈ R} = {j ∈ N | j < |τ ′|}; and
2. (Initial configurations) if |R| > 0 then (0, 0) ∈ R; and
3. (Monotonicity) for all (i, j) ∈ R and (i′, j′) ∈ R, if
i < i′ then j ≤ j′; and, symmetrically, if j < j′ then
i ≤ i′.
This definition ensures that a correspondence covers all
configurations in at least one of τ or τ ′, and if both traces are
non-empty, then the initial configurations in the traces corre-
spond to each other. The monotonicity requirement implies
that the observer observes each trace as it executes, and time
moves only forward.
Correspondences are both timing and termination insen-
sitive, implicitly assuming that an observer cannot directly
observe atomic transitions, and cannot detect if an execution
has terminated. The definition can be refined to provide tim-
ing and/or termination sensitivity. Termination sensitivity is
achieved by strengthening completeness to require that the
correspondence covers all configurations in both τ and τ ′,
and that no configuration in τ or τ ′ corresponds to an infi-
nite set of configurations. Timing sensitivity is achieved by
strengthening the definition so that every configuration in τ
and τ ′ corresponds to exactly one other configuration. Tim-
ing sensitivity implies an observer is able to observe each
time step, and entails termination sensitivity.
Having defined traces, correspondences, and observa-
tional equivalence of configurations, we can now state non-
interference. A command is noninterfering at level ` for vari-
able x, if input supplied in the variable x at the beginning of
the program has no observable effect for a user with security
clearance `, watching the execution of the system:
Definition 2 (Noninterference) A command c with typing
context Γ is noninterfering at level ` for variable x if for all
integers v1, v2 ∈ Z, all memories σ, and all traces τ1 and τ2
such that τi[0] = 〈c, update(σ, x, vi)〉 for i ∈ {1, 2}, there
exists a correspondence R for τ1 and τ2 such that for all
(i, j) ∈ R, τ1[i] ≈` τ2[j].
The definition of noninterference relies on a typing con-
text Γ, used in the definition of observational equivalence.
For brevity, we omit mention of Γ when clear from context.
Noninterference is too strong in the presence of declassifi-
cation, which intentionally makes secret information public.
Noninterference cannot express erasure requirements, which
make publicly observable information less observable. Mo-
tivated by these shortcomings of noninterference, we defined
noninterference according to policy.
4.2 Noninterference according to policy
Noninterference according to policy [2] is a semantic secu-
rity condition that generalizes noninterference, and allows
precise reasoning about the observability of information as it
undergoes declassification and erasure.
Noninterference according to policy is defined in terms of
the policy semantics, presented in Section 2. The intuition
behind the policy semantics is that if information in state s
has policy p enforced on it, then when the system enters state
s′, the information (or anything derived or influenced by it)
should be observable at level ` only if (s′, `) ∈ [[p]]s. Non-
interference according to policy makes this intuition precise.
Here, we specialize the definition of noninterference accord-
ing to policy for IMPE programs.
Definition 3 (Noninterference according to policy) A
command c with typing context Γ is noninterfering accord-
ing to policy for variable x if for all integers v1, v2 ∈ Z,
all memories σ, memories σ1 = update(σ, x, v1) and
σ2 = update(σ, x, v2), and all traces τ1 and τ2 such that
τi[0] = 〈c, σi〉 for i ∈ {1, 2}, there exists a correspondence
R for τ1 and τ2 such that for all (i, j) ∈ R, for all ` ∈ L, if
(τ1[i], `) 6∈ [[Γ(x)]]〈c, σ1〉 and (τ2[j], `) 6∈ [[Γ(x)]]〈c, σ2〉, then
τ1[i] ≈` τ2[j].
Like noninterference, noninterference according to policy
places restrictions on whether information input in variable x
is observable by a user during the execution of the program.
However, whereas noninterference required all correspond-
ing configurations to be observationally equivalent at a fixed
level `, noninterference according to policy is more precise,
and requires corresponding configurations to be observation-
ally equivalent at confidentiality levels determined by the se-
mantics of the policy enforced on the input. Thus, nonin-
terference according to policy reflects how the observability
of input may change during the execution of the system, as
declassifications and erasures occur.
Noninterference according to policy generalizes noninter-
ference. In particular, if the policy enforced on a variable x
indicates that information will never be observable at a con-
fidentiality level `, then noninterference according to policy
for variable x implies noninterference at level ` for variable
x. For example, a program that is noninterfering according to
policy and takes input in variable x with policy H enforced
on it, will never declassify the input to level L, and thus is
noninterfering at level L for x. The following theorem states
this formally.
Theorem 1 For all commands c, typing contexts Γ, and
variables x, if c is noninterfering according to policy for
variable x, then for all confidentiality levels ` such that for
all memories σ, ` 6∈ {`′ | (s, `′) ∈ [[Γ(x)]]〈c, σ〉}, c is nonin-
terfering at level ` for variable x.
The central result of this paper is that the type system and
runtime mechanisms of IMPE suffice to enforce erasure and
declassification policies. Thus, any well-typed IMPE pro-
gram is noninterfering according to policy.
Theorem 2 For all typing contexts Γ and commands c, if Γ
is well-formed, and pc,Γ ` c com for some policy pc, then
for all variables x ∈ Vars , c is noninterfering according to
policy for variable x.
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix B. It uses
Pottier and Simonet’s noninterference proof technique [19].
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5 To Jif and beyond
The Jif programming language [17] extends Java [7] with
information-flow control, allowing security policy annota-
tions on program variables and method signatures. In this
section, we describe how we extended Jif with declassifica-
tion and erasure policies, and mechanisms to enforce these
policies. The resulting language is called JifE .
5.1 Decentralized label model
Security policies in Jif are from the decentralized label
model (DLM) [16]. In DLM labels, security principals de-
clare confidentiality and integrity restrictions on informa-
tion. The reader policy or means that the principal o owns
the policy, and allows principal r to learn, or read, informa-
tion; the writer policy o   w is also owned by principal o,
who allows principal w to influence, or write, information.1
A label consists of conjunctions (unionsq) and disjunctions (u) of
reader and writer policies. Within a label, different principals
may declare different restrictions, making the DLM suitable
for reasoning about security in the presence of mutual dis-
trust between principals. Variable types and method signa-
tures in Jif may be annotated with labels. A labeled type is a
pair of a base type (a primitive type or class) and a label.
We extended the DLM to allow principals to specify confi-
dentiality restrictions using declassification and erasure poli-
cies. That is, declassification and erasure policies may now
appear in reader policies on the right of the arrow.
The base lattice of confidentiality levels is the set of se-
curity principals, which is closed under conjunction (∧) and
disjunction (∨) [13, 23], and so forms the necessary lattice
structure. For example, the reader policy Alice  (Bob ∨
Chuck) a↗Bob is owned by Alice, who requires the erasure
policy (Bob ∨ Chuck) a↗Bob to be enforced. The erasure
policy initially allows Bob or Chuck to read information, but
once a is satisfied, only Bob may read it.
Instead of security principals, we could have used the de-
centralized labels as the base lattice. This would allow labels
such as (AliceBob)↘a (Chuck Dave). However, this
approach runs counter to the philosophy of decentralization,
because it prevents different principals from declaring their
own declassification and erasure requirements.
For the condition language, we allow a restricted class of
expressions: access path expressions of type condition,
and negations of these access path expressions. The type
condition is a new primitive type with two values: true
and false. Expressions of type condition may be cast
to boolean, and vice versa. An access path expression is
an expression of the form r.f1. . . . .fn, where r is a local
variable, the special variable this, or a class name; each
fi is a field; and all path elements other than the last are
declared final. Immutability of path elements is needed
for sound reasoning about conditions within the type system.
1The mnemonic for arrow direction in reader and writer policies is that
in a reader policy o r, information may flow to principal r, whereas in a
writer policy o w, information may flow from principal w.
5.2 Syntax and semantics
JifE extends Jif’s syntax and runtime system to incorpo-
rate the guarded declassification syntax and runtime erasure
mechanisms of Section 3.
JifE contains the new guarded declassification expression
declassify(e, Lf to Lt using e0, . . . , ek), where Lf and Lt
are labels, and each expression ei is of type condition.
The expression is evaluated by first evaluating e to a value
v, then evaluating each ei in turn; if any ei evaluates to
false, then an UnsatisfiedConditionException
is thrown; otherwise, the expression evaluates to v. If the
evaluation of e or any ei results in an exception, the declas-
sification expression also results in the exception. As in the
typing rule for declassification in Figure 7, type checking en-
sures that Lf may be relabeled Lt under the assumption that
all conditions ei are satisfied.
Note that Jif already provides a mechanism for selective
declassification [15, 14, 18], whereby a declassification that
weakens or removes a policy owned by principal o requires
o’s authority. By contrast, guarded declassification does not
require the authority of any principal, since given a reader
policy o (p↘a q), the principal o has already stated that in-
formation may be declassified when condition a is satisfied.
In JifE , selective declassification and guarded declassifica-
tion coexist as separate and independent mechanisms.
To enforce erasure policies, JifE ensures that a variable or
location that has label L enforced on it is overwritten when-
ever any erasure policy in L requires it. For example, if a lo-
cation has the label {Alice(Bob this.f↗Chuck) uDave
(Alice this.o.d↗>)} enforced on it, then the location is over-
written whenever either this.f or this.o.d evaluates to
true. When a location or variable is overwritten, its con-
tents are replaced with an appropriate default value. Thus,
numeric locations are overwritten with zero, and reference
locations are overwritten with null. Section 5.4 describes
the runtime mechanisms used to achieve this. This erasure
mechanism is analogous to the erasure mechanism of IMPE ,
which overwrites variables if the policy enforced on the vari-
able requires erasure.
5.2.1 Interaction with Java and Jif features
Jif is intended for practical information-flow control. It sup-
ports a large subset of Java’s language features, and provides
additional features such as dynamic labels, constant arrays,
and class and method polymorphism, needed for building
real applications. The erasure enforcement mechanism of
IMPE needs careful adaptation for these language features.
Final fields and variables. In Java, fields, local variables,
and formal arguments can be marked final, meaning their
value will not change after initialization. To respect the fi-
nality of variables and locations, JifE requires that final vari-
ables and fields cannot be overwritten. The label L enforced
on a final field or variable must not contain any erasure poli-
cies, and if L contains a dynamic label (see below), then the
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dynamic label must not contain any erasure policies. This
ensures that label L never requires erasure.
Arrays. Jif allows different labels to be enforced on the
elements of an array and the array itself. If the label en-
forced on the elements of an array requires erasure, the array
is overwritten with appropriate default values; the length of
the array is not altered. Jif supports constant arrays, whose
elements cannot be modified after initialization. As with
final fields, labels on elements of constant arrays must
never require erasure.
Dynamic labels. Jif can represent labels at runtime and
treat labels as first-class values. The primitive type label
is the type of runtime labels, and Jif permits runtime com-
parisons of dynamic labels. JifE extends the runtime rep-
resentation of labels to permit declassification and erasure
policies to also be represented at runtime. We introduce a
new kind of label, to reason about runtime labels that may
require erasure. The primitive type elabel is used for dy-
namic labels that may require erasure. Only dynamic labels
of type elabel may contain erasure policies; a dynamic la-
bel of type label cannot contain erasure policies. Thus,
the labels of final fields, final variables, and elements of con-
stant arrays, may refer to dynamic labels of type label,
but may not refer to dynamic labels of type elabel. The
type label can be cast to elabel, but not vice versa. The
restriction that only elabels may contain erasure policies
also simplifies backwards compatibility of JifE with Jif.
Polymorphism. Jif provides polymorphism for the labels
of method arguments. For example, the method signature
double{a} sine(double{Alice  Bob} a) states that the
label on the value returned is the same as the label of the
actual argument a, which can be no more restrictive than
{Alice Bob}. In Jif method bodies, the label of a formal
argument is a polymorphic label, representing the label of
actual argument, and bounded above by the argument label
specified in the signature. However, because actual argu-
ments may require erasure during the method body execu-
tion, we need to know what label to enforce on formal ar-
guments in the method body. Thus, in JifE , method bodies
assume that the label of a formal argument is simply the ar-
gument label bound specified in the signature. This is sound,
but not as permissive as Jif, and effectively removes argu-
ment label polymorphism. However, it is not overly restric-
tive: we successfully implemented a remote voting system
in 14,000 lines of JifE code, as discussed in Section 6.
Jif also supports polymorphic classes, permitting classes
to be parameterized on labels and principals.2 JifE extends
the class parameters to allow parameters of type elabel.
2Jif as of version 3.1 does not support Java generics, another form of
class parameterization for polymorphism.
5.3 Information flow
Jif’s existing type-system tracks information flow. As dis-
cussed in Section 3, condition satisfaction can itself be used
as a covert storage channel. JifE extends Jif’s type system to
soundly track this potential information flow.
Condition satisfaction affects whether the expression
declassify(e, Lf to Lt using e0, . . . , ek) declassifies e or
throws an UnsatisfiedConditionException. JifE
requires that the label of each ei is no more restrictive than
label Lt .
Condition satisfaction may also cause variables and loca-
tions to be overwritten. JifE tracks these information flows
analogously to the IMPE policy typing judgment Γ ` p pol.
JifE requires that whenever a label L is declared in a pro-
gram, for any erasure policy p e↗q that occurring in L, the
label of expression emust be no more restrictive than L. JifE
also requires that if lbl is a dynamic label that occurs in L,
then the value lbl must be no more restrictive than L. So, if
e is a condition that appears in lbl, then the label of e is no
more restrictive than lbl, and thus no more restrictive than
L.
5.4 Translation
The Jif compiler [17] is a source-to-source compiler, produc-
ing Java code as output. Jif programs rely on a small trusted
runtime library, implemented in Java, that provides function-
ality such as runtime comparisons of labels. We extended
the runtime library, and modified the source-to-source trans-
lation, to provide runtime support for erasure.
The key idea is that if a variable or location may need to
be overwritten depending on the satisfaction of a condition
a, then a listener is registered with condition a; the listener
is notified whenever the value of a changes, and the listener
will overwrite the variable or location if necessary.
If a local variable may need to be overwritten, then the
translation moves the local variable to the heap, to allow a
condition listener to access it, and overwrite it as needed.
Assignments to fields and local variables are translated to
check that the variable or field does not currently require era-
sure. The combination of condition listeners and assignment
checks ensures that whenever the label enforced on the vari-
able or location requires erasure, the variable or location will
be zero or null as appropriate.
Overwriting a variable or location of type condition
may trigger the overwriting of other variables and locations.
To ensure that updating a condition does not cause an infi-
nite cascade of listener invocations, the type system of JifE
requires that for all conditions a, the value of a cannot (di-
rectly or indirectly) control whether a needs to be overwrit-
ten. This is analogous to ensuring that the overwrite depen-
dency relation ≺Γ of Section 3 is well-founded.
6 Case study: Civitas
Using JifE , we implemented Civitas [3], a practical, secure,
remote voting system. The use of declassification and era-
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sure policies in the implementation of Civitas help ensure
that the system’s security requirements are satisfied. This
section discusses the experience of using JifE to implement
Civitas.
Civitas guarantees strong security properties in the pres-
ence of a strong adversary. The design of Civitas refines a
cryptographic voting scheme by Juels, Catalano, and Jakob-
sson [12]. The entities involved in a Civitas election in-
clude an election supervisor, voters, and election authorities,
which are mutually distrusting entities that collaborate to run
an election. A Civitas election has several phases.
1. Setup. The electoral roll is established and shared keys
are generated.
2. Registration. Voters retrieve credentials from election
authorities.
3. Voting. Voters vote using their credentials.
4. Tabulation. Election authorities tabulate the election re-
sults.
More details of the design and security assurances of Civitas
are available in a recent publication [3].
Civitas is implemented in 14,000 lines of JifE code, with
about 8,000 additional lines of Java code to perform I/O and
implement cryptographic operations. Declassification and
erasure policies are used in four distinct places.
• Generation of a shared key by authorities. During
setup, authorities engage in a protocol to generate a
shared El Gamal key pair. Each authority generates a
share of the key pair, and publishes a commitment to it.
Each authority publishes its share of the public key, but
only after all commitments are published.
The label {AiAi↘allCommPosted⊥;Ai Ai} is used
for authorityAi’s public key share. The declassification
policy requires that initially the information is readable
only by election authority Ai, and may be declassified
to be readable by everyone (represented by the bottom
principal ⊥) when condition allCommPosted is sat-
isfied. Condition allCommPosted is a field of type
condition. It is easy to check that this field is only
updated onceAi has successfully retrieved all key com-
mitments. The writer policy Ai Ai indicates that the
key share was influenced only by Ai.
• Commit-reveal protocol by authorities. During tabula-
tion, the authorities jointly generate random bits, and
each authority must believe that the bits are random.
Each authority selects random bits, and publishes a
commitment to these bits. Once all commitments are
published, each authority reveals its bits, which can be
combined to form a sequence of bits that all authorities
agree are random.
Similar to the key shares, the label {Ai 
Ai↘allBitsPosted⊥;Ai Ai} is used for authority Ai’s
random bits. Condition allBitsPosted is a field of type
condition, and it is easy to check that this field is
only updated once Ai has been able to successfully re-
trieve all bit commitments.
• Management of credential shares by authorities. Dur-
ing registration, each authority generates a credential
share for each voter. Each voter contacts each authority
to retrieve his shares, combining them into a credential
that can be used to vote. After delivering the share to
the voter, the authority removes the share from the sys-
tem. This helps ensure that the voter’s anonymity is not
violated should Ai be subsequently compromised.
Authority Ai enforces the label {Ai 
(Ai delivered↗>)↘deliveryReq⊥;Ai   Ai} on each
voter credential share. Condition deliveryReq is satis-
fied when the voter has requested his credential share,
and has authenticated himself to the authority. The
satisfaction of this condition allows the declassification
of the share.3 Any copies of the information that
were not declassified must be erased when condition
delivered is satisfied upon successful retrieval by the
voter.
• Management of voter credential shares by voting
clients. After voter Vj has retrieved all credential shares
from the authorities, he combines them into a single
credential, which he then uses to vote, publishing it to-
gether with his ballot. After combining the shares, the
voter deletes them, to remove any record of which au-
thority provided which share.
The voter enforces on each credential share the label
{Vj  (Vj postCombined↗>)↘combined⊥}. Upon com-
bining the shares into a credential, condition combined
is satisfied, and the voter can declassify the credential to
allow it to be published with his ballot. After combining
shares, condition postCombined is satisfied, and unde-
classified copies of the shares (or of information derived
from them) are erased.
JifE allows complex declassification and erasure security
requirements to be clearly and unambiguously declared on
the data. In addition to stating what security must currently
be enforced on the data, the policies limit how the data may
be used in the future. The information flow analysis ensures
that uses of the data conform to the declared security poli-
cies. This provides additional assurance that the Civitas im-
plementation is correct. The policy annotations serve as a
form of documentation, making complex information secu-
rity requirements visible in the code itself.
7 Related work
The most closely related work is that of Hunt and Sands [11].
Concurrently with this work, they consider the enforcement
of simple erasure policies of the form `↗`′, where erasure
is required at the end of a lexical scope. These policies are
3Ideally, the declassification policy should allow the share to be readable
only by the voter Vj it is intended for. In the protocol between authority Ai
and Vj , each authenticates to the other, and they establish a shared key k;
the credential share is sent to Vj encrypted with k. The reasoning supported
by the DLM is not powerful enough to determine that information encrypted
with k is readable only by Ai and Vj . Extending it to reason about the sub-
tleties of cryptography would allow a more precise declassification policy,
but is largely orthogonal to this work.
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a restricted instantiation of the policy framework used here,
where policies cannot be nested and the condition language
is limited to specifying the end of lexical scopes. Using flow-
sensitive typing contexts [10], Hunt and Sands present an
elegant type system to enforce erasure policies; their system
requires no runtime erasure mechanism.
Comparing our work to Hunt and Sands’ highlights a ten-
sion between expressiveness of erasure conditions and ease
of enforcement. Simpler condition languages are easier to
reason about statically, and thus easier to enforce statically.
Hunt and Sands’ conditions are tied to lexical scopes, and it
is straightforward to reason statically about when conditions
are satisfied. By contrast, the condition language used in this
work is program expressions: flexible, but difficult to rea-
son about statically. Because it is difficult or impossible to
know the value of an arbitrary expression at a given program
point prior to execution, it is difficult to determine statically
whether a policy will require erasure at that program point,
and thus difficult to enforce erasure statically. Instead, we
use a simple runtime mechanism to enforce erasure, an ap-
proach similar in spirit to hybrid type checking [5].
Although runtime mechanisms are used to help enforce
erasure and declassification, information flow control in
IMPE is static, using a type system to track and restrict
the flow of information. Starting with Volpano, Smith and
Irvine [24], type systems have proven successful in providing
information flow control without the overhead of represent-
ing security labels at runtime; many of these type systems
are surveyed by Sabelfeld and Myers [20], and Sabelfeld and
Sands [21] discuss some of the recent type systems that con-
sider declassification.
Hansen and Probst [9] consider information flow security
in Java Card bytecode, and identify the utility of erasure poli-
cies in providing security assurance. They consider “simple
erasure policies” of the form L end↗H , where end is a con-
dition indicating the end of execution of the current program.
They define a corresponding simple erasure security condi-
tion. They conjecture, but do not demonstrate, that simple
erasure is straightforward to enforce.
Hansen and Probst [8] have also used erasure policies in
secure dynamic program repartitioning. Secure program par-
titioning [25] is a technique to split data and code across a
set of mutually distrusting hosts while guaranteeing security.
Hansen and Probst consider repartitioning a program when
the set of hosts changes dynamically, and use erasure policies
to ensure that old copies of data are removed from the sys-
tem when repartitioning occurs. Hansen and Probst do not
describe how to enforce the erasure policies. Søndergaard’s
subsequent master’s thesis [22] discusses the trusted runtime
components required to enforce these erasure policies, but
does not implement them.
Sabelfeld and Sands [21] consider different aspects of de-
classification, and propose four semantic principles for de-
classification, three of which are applicable to erasure. Non-
interference according to policy satisfies semantic consis-
tency and conservativity, but does not satisfy non-occlusion
precisely because, as Hunt and Sands [11] point out, the poli-
cies address when, but not what, information is erased and
declassified.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown how to enforce erasure require-
ments end-to-end in language-based settings. Erasure re-
quirements are specified in a flexible and powerful policy
framework [2] that can also express declassification require-
ments. The policies express when information may be de-
classified, and when information must be erased.
We have proved that an information-flow control type
system, in conjunction with a runtime mechanism for era-
sure, can enforce the erasure and declassification policies in
IMPE , a simple imperative language. Well-typed IMPE pro-
grams satisfy noninterference according to policy [2].
The end-to-end enforcement of erasure and declassifica-
tion policies is also practical: we have extended the Jif pro-
gramming language [17] with erasure and declassification
policies and enforcement mechanisms, and used the result-
ing language to implement a secure remote voting system.
The ultimate goal of this work is to make it easy for pro-
grammers to write secure programs, and to have assurance
that these programs are secure. This work, by providing
provably secure enforcement of expressive erasure and de-
classification policies, brings us closer to that goal.
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A Sound relabeling judgment
Figure 10 shows inference rules for the a0, . . . , ak ` p ≤
q judgment. The rule RL-LATTICE states that information
may be relabeled from lattice policy ` to lattice policy `′ in
any state, provided that ` v `′. The rule RL-TRANS makes
the judgment transitive on policies.
The declassification rule RL-DECL permits relabeling
from a declassification policy p↘ap′ to policy p′, provided
that condition a is satisfied. This rule captures the intuitive
meaning of declassification policies: declassification may
occur when the appropriate condition is satisfied. Note that
rule RL-DECL permits relabeling from p↘ap′ to p′, and p′
may permit declassifications or require erasures that p↘ap′
does not.
The declassification introduction rule RL-DECL-I de-
scribes when it is permissible to relabel information from
some policy q to the policy p↘ap′. First, it must be permit-
ted to relabel information from q to p when a0, . . . , ak are
satisfied; second, in any state where condition a is satisfied,
it must be permitted to relabel information from q to p′.
The declassification elimination rule RL-DECL-E allows
information to be relabeled from a declassification policy
p↘ap′ to the policy p. Intuitively, it is acceptable to relabel
information from p↘ap′ to p, since policy p is always more
restrictive than policy p↘ap′, which enforces everything that
p does but also permits declassification to p′.
The rule RL-DECL-DECL describes when information
may be relabeled from one declassification policy p↘ap′ to
another, more restrictive declassification policy q↘b q′. The
intuition is that this is permitted if q is at least as restrictive
as p when a0, . . . , ak are satisfied, the policy q↘b q′ permits
declassification only when p↘ap′ does (that is, b = a), and,
whenever declassification is permitted, q′ is at least as re-
strictive as p′.
As can be seen by inspection of Figure 10, each of the
relabeling rules for erasure policies corresponds to a relabel-
ing rule for declassification. For example, erasure introduc-
tion RL-ERASE-I is analogous to RL-DECL-E: information
may be relabeled from p to p a↗p′, since p a↗p′ is always
more restrictive than p. An erasure policy p a↗p′ enforces
everything that p does, and in addition requires the informa-
tion to be erased at certain times.
Erasure elimination RL-ERASE-E is analogous to the rule
for declassification introduction, allowing information to be
relabeled from p a↗p′ to q provided that p can be relabeled
to q when conditions a0, . . . , ak are satisfied, and p′ can be
relabeled to q at all times. Intuitively, information may be
relabeled to q since information labeled q would not need to
be erased when a is satisfied, as q is at least as restrictive as
both p and p′.
The rule RL-ERASE-ERASE compares two erasure poli-
cies, p a↗p′ and q b↗q′, and is similar to RL-DECL-DECL.
Information may be relabeled from p a↗p′ to q b↗q′ provided
that q is at least as restrictive as p when a0, . . . , ak are satis-
fied, and whenever p a↗p′ requires information to be erased,
so does q b↗q′ (that is, b = a), and at all times, q′ is at least
as restrictive as p′.
There is no erasure rule analogous to RL-DECL. This is
because erasure policies specify information flows that must
not happen, which is difficult to capture with inference rules
of this style. Instead, the onus of ensuring information is
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RL-LATTICE
` v `′
a0, . . . , ak ` ` ≤ `′
RL-TRANS
a0, . . . , ak ` p ≤ p′
a0, . . . , ak ` p′ ≤ p′′
a0, . . . , ak ` p ≤ p′′
RL-DECL
a ∈ {a0, . . . , ak}
a0, . . . , ak ` p↘ap′ ≤ p′
RL-DECL-I
a0, . . . , ak ` q ≤ p
a ` q ≤ p′
a0, . . . , ak ` q ≤ p↘ap′
RL-DECL-E
a0, . . . , ak ` p↘ap′ ≤ p
RL-DECL-DECL
a0, . . . , ak ` p ≤ q
a ` p′ ≤ q′
a0, . . . , ak ` p↘ap′ ≤ q↘a q′
RL-ERASE-I
a0, . . . , ak ` p ≤ p a↗p′
RL-ERASE-E
a0, . . . , ak ` p ≤ q
` p′ ≤ q
a0, . . . , ak ` p a↗p′ ≤ q
RL-ERASE-ERASE
a0, . . . , ak ` p ≤ q
` p′ ≤ q′
a0, . . . , ak ` p a↗p′ ≤ q a↗q′)
Figure 10: Inference rules for a0, . . . , ak ` p ≤ q
erased at appropriate times falls upon the system that en-
forces the policies.
Theorem 3 If a0, . . . , ak ` p ≤ q then for all states s, such
that ∀i ∈ 0..k. s  ai, we have [[p]]s ⊇ [[q]]s.
Proof: We proceed by induction on the proof of
a0, . . . , ak ` p ≤ q. The inductive hypothesis is that for
any premise of the form a0, . . . , ak ` p′ ≤ q′, we have
[[p′]]s ⊇ [[q′]]s for any state s such that ∀i ∈ 0..k. s  ai.
• RL-LATTICE, RL-TRANS. Trivial.
• RL-DECL. Here p ≡ p′↘a q, and s  a. We have
[[p′↘a q]]s = [[p′]]s ∪
⋃{[[q]]s′ | s →∗ s′ and s′  a} ⊇
[[q]]s, since s  a.
• RL-DECL-I. Here q ≡ q′↘b q′′, and a0, . . . , ak ` p ≤
q′, and b ` p ≤ q′′. By the inductive hypothesis, we
have [[p]]s ⊇ [[q′]]s and [[p]]s′ ⊇ [[q′′]]s′ for any state s′
such that s′  b. Thus, [[p]]s ⊇ [[q]]s as required.
• RL-DECL-E. Here p ≡ q↘ap′, and [[q↘ap′]]s =
[[q]]s ∪
⋃{[[p′]]s′ | s→∗ s′ and s′  a} ⊇ [[q]]s.
• RL-DECL-DECL. Here p ≡ p′↘ap′′ and q ≡ q′↘a q′′.
By the inductive hypothesis, we have [[p′]]s ⊇ [[q′]]s.
Also, for any s′ such that s →∗ s′ and s′  a, we have
a ` p′′ ≤ q′′, so by the inductive hypothesis, [[p′′]]s′ ⊇
[[q′′]]s′ . So we have [[p′↘ap′′]]s ⊇ [[q′↘a q′′]]s.
• RL-ERASE-E. Here p ≡ p′ a↗p′′, and, by the induc-
tive hypothesis, [[p′]]s ⊇ [[q]]s and [[p′′]]s′ ⊇ [[q]]s′ for
any state s′. Suppose we have a pair (s′, `) ∈ [[q]]s. Ei-
ther (1) (s′, `) ∈ [[p′]]s and [s, s′] 2 a, or (2) (s′, `) ∈
[[p′]]s ∩ [[p′′]]s′′ for some s′′ such that s →∗ s′′ and
[s, s′′) 2 a. If case (1) then (s′, `) ∈ [[p]]s. If case (2)
then by assumption ` p′′ ≤ q, and by the inductive hy-
pothesis, we have [[p′′]]s′′ ⊇ [[q]]s′′ , and so (s′, `) ∈ [[p]]s.
Thus [[p]]s ⊇ [[q]]s as required.
• RL-ERASE-I. Here q ≡ p b↗q′. Clearly, [[p]]s ⊇
[[p b↗q′]]s = [[q]]s.
• RL-ERASE-ERASE. Here p ≡ p′ a↗p′′ and q ≡
q′ a↗q′′. By the inductive hypothesis, we have [[p′]]s ⊇
[[q′]]s and for all s′, [[p′′]]s′ ⊇ [[q′′]]s′ . Suppose we
have a pair (s′, `) ∈ [[q′]]s. Either (1) (s′, `) ∈ [[q′]]s
and [s, s′] 2 a, or (2) (s′, `) ∈ [[q]]s ∩ [[q′′]]s′′ for
some s′′ such that s →∗ s′′ and [s, s′′) 2 a. If case
(1) then (s′, `) ∈ [[p]]s. If case (2) then by assump-
tion ` p′′ ≤ q′′, and by the inductive hypothesis, we
have [[p′′]]s′′ ⊇ [[q′′]]s′′ , and so (s′, `) ∈ [[p]]s. Thus
[[p]]s ⊇ [[q]]s as required.
B Proof of Theorem 2
In this appendix we present the syntax and semantics of the
language IMP2E , show that it is adequate to represent evalua-
tion of two IMPE programs, and show that type preservation
in IMP2E implies Theorem 2.
This proof technique is based on Pottier and Si-
monet’s [19] technique for showing noninterference in the
ML programming language.
For notational convenience we write reqErase(p, τ) as an
abbreviation for reqErase(p, τ [|τ | − 1]), where τ is a finite
trace. For finite trace τ and trace τ ′ where τ [|τ |−1]→ τ ′[0]
we write ττ ′ for the trace obtained by appending τ ′ to τ .
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B.1 Syntax and Semantics
The language IMP2E extends IMPE with pair constructs for
commands L c1 | c2 M, and integers L v1 | v2 M. The pair con-
structs represent different commands and integers that may
arise in two different executions of a program. A command
pair cannot be nested inside another command pair, but can
otherwise appear nested at arbitrary depth. Integer pairs are
used to track how memories differ in different executions of
a program: memories in IMP2E are functions from variables
to integers and integer pairs.
IMP2E syntax
c ::= Commands
. . . IMPE commandsL c1 | c2 M Pair command
For an extended command c, let the projections bcc1 and
bcc2 represent the two IMPE commands that c encodes. The
projection functions satisfy bL c1 | c2 Mci = ci, and are homo-
morphisms on other commands. Similarly for integer pairs,
bL v1 | v2 Mci = vi. The projection functions are extended to
memories, so that
bσci(x) =
{
v if σ(x) = v
vi if σ(x) = L v1 | v2 M
The evaluation of expressions are also extended, so that bi-
nary operations ⊕ are homomorphic on integer pairs. Thus,
the evaluation of an expression e in a memory σ may be ei-
ther an integer v or an integer pair L v1 | v2 M.
We extend configurations to triples 〈c, σ〉i for an index i ∈
{•, 1, 2}. The index indicates if the command c and memory
σ represent a pair of configurations (•), or the left (1) or right
(2) side of a pair of configurations. A configuration 〈c, σ〉i
is well formed if i ∈ {1, 2} implies that c does not contain
any command pairs, and the image of σ does not contain any
integer pairs.
The operational semantics of IMP2E are given in Figure 11,
and extend the operational semantics of IMPE . The rule
OS-PAIR-LIFT allows the evaluation of either element of a
command pair L c1 | c2 M. The rule OS-PAIR-SKIP removes
a command pair when both elements of the pair have fin-
ished execution. The rule OS-PAIR-IF is used when the
conditional of an if command evaluates to different values
in the two executions, and as a result, a command pair is
introduced, representing the different commands that each
execution will evaluate. Note that this is the only way in
which a command pair can be introduced into a configura-
tion. For succinctness, this rule uses a ternary expression,
(vi 6= 0)?c0 :c1, which is equal to c0 if the predicate vi 6= 0 is
true, and to c1 otherwise. The rule OS-PAIR-DECLASSIFY
is used when the evaluation of conditions for a declassifica-
tion differ in the two executions. The rule uses the evalua-
tion of the product of the conditions, e0×· · ·×ek, since this
product will 0 if and only if there is some ei that evaluates to
zero.
The rules for IMPE , given in Figure 5, are adapted by in-
dexing each configuration with i to become rules for IMP2E .
We assume that a premise of the form σ(e) 6= 0 means there
is an integer v (not an integer pair) such that σ(e) = v and
v 6= 0. The utility functions update(·, ·, ·) and erasure(·)
are adapted for IMP2E ; the new versions, update
2(·, ·, ·) and
erasure2(·), are presented in Figure 5. For the adapted
IMPE rules, the version of the function to use depends upon
the configuration index: the IMP2E versions if the index is •;
the IMPE versions otherwise.
B.2 Adequacy
The language IMP2E is adequate for reasoning about the ex-
ecution of two IMPE programs. We show that execution of
a IMP2E program is sound (a step taken by a IMP
2
E program
corresponds to one or zero steps taken by its projections),
and complete (given two IMPE executions, there is a IMP2E
execution whose projection agrees with at least one of them).
We use→= to denote the reflexive closure of the relation→.
Lemma 1 (Soundness) If 〈c, σ〉• → 〈c′, σ′〉•, then
〈bcci, bσci〉 →= 〈bc′ci, bσ′ci〉 for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof: By induction on the derivation 〈c, σ〉• → 〈c′, σ′〉•.
The interesting cases are the new rules introduced for IMP2E :
OS-PAIR-LIFT, OS-PAIR-SKIP, OS-PAIR-IF, and OS-
PAIR-DECLASSIFY. For a reduction using OS-PAIR-LIFT,
clearly one of the two projections takes a step, while the
other projection remains unchanged. For OS-PAIR-SKIP,
both projections remain unchanged. For both OS-PAIR-IF,
and OS-PAIR-DECLASSIFY, both projections take a step.
Lemma 2 (Stuck configurations) If 〈c, σ〉• is stuck (i.e.,
cannot be reduced and c 6= skip), then 〈bcci, bσci〉 is stuck
for some i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof: By structural induction on command c.
Lemma 3 (Completeness) If 〈bcci, bσci〉 →∗ 〈c′i, σ′i〉 for
i ∈ {1, 2}, then there exists a IMP2E configuration 〈c′, σ′〉•
such that 〈c, σ〉• →∗ 〈c′, σ′〉• and 〈bc′ci, bσ′ci〉 = 〈c′i, σ′i〉
for some i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof: Let τi = 〈bcci, bσci〉 . . . 〈c′i, σ′i〉. Let ni be the
length of τi. For a IMP2E trace τ = 〈c, σ〉• . . . 〈c′, σ′〉•, let
fi(τ) be ni minus the number of reduction steps in τ that
reduce the ith projection. Note that fi(τ) is non-negative.
Consider g(τ) = min(f1(τ), f2(τ)). If g(τ) = 0, then τ is
a trace that satisfies the conditions.
Suppose g(τ) > 0. Consider the function
h(τ) = (g(τ), |f1(τ)− f2(τ)|, numPairs(τ [|τ | − 1]))
where numPairs(〈c, σ〉•) returns the number of pair com-
mands in c. Note that all elements of the triple returned by
h(τ) are non-negative. If we can extend τ by one step to a
trace τ ′ such that h(τ ′) < h(τ) under lexicographic order-
ing, then, by repeated applications, eventually we will pro-
duce a trace τ ′′ such that g(τ ′′) = 0.
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OS-PAIR-LIFT
〈ci, bσci〉i → 〈c′i, σ′i〉i
{i, j} = {1, 2} c′j = cj σ′j = bσcj
σ′ = λx.

0 if reqErase(Γ(x), bσc1) and
reqErase(Γ(x), bσc2)Lσ′1(x) |σ′2(x) M if bσci(x) 6= σ′i(x)
σ(x) otherwise
〈L c1 | c2 M, σ〉• → 〈L c′1 | c′2 M, σ′〉•
OS-PAIR-SKIP
〈L skip | skip M, σ〉• → 〈skip, σ〉•
OS-PAIR-IF
σ(e) = L v1 | v2 M
c′i = (vi 6= 0) ? c0 : c1
〈if e then c0 else c1, σ〉• → 〈L c′1 | c′2 M, σ〉•
OS-PAIR-DECLASSIFY
σ(e0 × · · · × ek) = L v1 | v2 M
v′i = (vi 6= 0) ? bσ(e)ci : 0
σ′ = update2(σ, x, L v′1 | v′2 M)
〈x := declassify(e, Lf to Lt using e0, . . . , ek), σ〉• → 〈skip, σ′〉•
update2(σ, y, w) = λx.

0 if ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. reqErase(Γ(x), σ′i)Lσ′1(x) |σ′2(x) M if ∃i ∈ {1, 2}. bσci(x) 6= σ′i(x)
and ∃i ∈ {1, 2}. ¬reqErase(Γ(x), σ′i)
σ(x) otherwise
where σ′i = update(bσci, y, bwci)
erasure2(σ) = λx.

0 if ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. reqErase(Γ(x), σ′i)Lσ′1(x) |σ′2(x) M if ∃i ∈ {1, 2}. bσci(x) 6= σ′i(x)
and ∃i ∈ {1, 2}. ¬reqErase(Γ(x), σ′i)
σ(x) otherwise
where σ′i = erasure(bσci)
Figure 11: Operational semantics of IMP2E
We now show how to extend τ to a trace τ ′ such that
h(τ ′) < h(τ). By assumption, g(τ) > 0, so neither τ1 or
τ2 is stuck. By Lemma 2, we can extend τ by one more step,
producing trace τ ′. By Lemma 1, either fi(τ ′) = fi(τ) − 1
for some i ∈ {1, 2}, or fi(τ ′) = fi(τ) for all i ∈ {1, 2}.
If the former, then h(τ ′) < h(τ). If the latter, then the rule
OS-PAIR-SKIP was used in the reduction, and the last con-
figuration of τ ′ has one fewer pair command than the last
configuration of τ , and so h(τ ′) < h(τ).
B.3 Type preservation
We extend the type system to type IMP2E commands and
configurations. The typing judgment for commands is now
of the form τ, pc,Γ ` c com, where τ is an execution trace.
If τ, pc,Γ ` c com, then command c is well-typed with
typing context Γ and program counter policy pc at the pro-
gram point when trace τ has been produced. Typing rules for
IMPE (given in Figure 7) are made typing rules for IMP2E by
adding the additional typing parameter τ to each rule. Simi-
larly, the judgment τ, pc,Γ ` 〈c, σ〉• config means that con-
p ≤〈c, σ〉 p
τ = τ ′〈c, σ〉 ¬reqErase(p′, τ ′)
p ≤τ ′ p′ [[p′]]σ ⊇ [[q]]σ
p ≤τ q
Figure 13: Inference rules for p ≤τ q
figuration 〈c, σ〉• is well-typed with typing context Γ and
program counter policy pc at the program point when trace
τ has been produced.
The two new typing rules, shown in Figure 12, make use
of the predicate protected(p, τ). Informally, if for policy p
the predicate protected(p, τ) is true, then the program input
may have flowed through the program, and now be labeled
with the policy p. Thus, this predicate depends on the ex-
ecution trace τ . Note that the premises for the typing rule
for pairs, T-PAIR, uses the typing judgments for IMPE , i.e.,
without the trace τ . This is because well-formed commands
do not have nested command pairs.
To formalize how program input may be relabeled with
different policies, we use the extended relabeling relation
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T-PAIR
` pc ≤ pc′ protected(pc′, τ)
¬reqErase(pc′, bτc1) pc′,Γ ` c1 com
¬reqErase(pc′, bτc2) pc′,Γ ` c2 com
τ, pc,Γ ` L c1 | c2 M com
T-CONFIG
τ, pc,Γ ` c com
∀x ∈ Vars. (σ(x) = L v1 | v2 M)⇒ protected(Γ(x), τ)
τ, pc,Γ ` 〈c, σ〉• config
Figure 12: Typing rules for IMP2E
p ≤τ q. For policies p and q and finite trace τ , if p ≤τ q,
then input in τ [0], the initial configuration of trace τ , labeled
with policy p can influence information labeled with policy
q in final configuration of τ . Inference rules for this relation
are given in Figure 13.
More formally, we define protected(p, τ) as
protected(p, τ) , (¬reqErase(p, bτc1) ∨
¬reqErase(p, bτc2)) ∧
∀i ∈ {1, 2}. ¬reqErase(p, bτci)⇒
Γ(x) ≤bτci p
where the variable x is the variable in which program input
is placed.
The extended relabeling relation has a nice property with
respect to the semantics of policies. If τ = 〈c, σ〉 . . . 〈c′, σ′〉
and p ≤τ q then the semantics of q in 〈c′, σ′〉 are a sub-
set of the semantics of p in 〈c, σ〉. We prove this using the
following lemma.
Lemma 4 If 〈c, σ〉 → 〈c′, σ′〉 and ¬reqErase(p, σ) then
[[p]]〈c′, σ′〉 ⊆ [[p]]〈c, σ〉.
Proof: By induction on the structure of p.
Property 2 If τ = 〈c, σ〉 . . . 〈c′, σ′〉 and p ≤τ q then
[[q]]〈c′, σ′〉 ⊆ [[p]]〈c, σ〉.
Proof: By induction on the derivation of p ≤τ q, using
Lemma 4.
A well-typed IMP2E program tracks information flow from
the initial input. The execution of a IMP2E program preserves
typing. This key theorem will allow us to prove that well-
typed IMP2E satisfied noninterference according to policy.
Theorem 4 (Type preservation) Let Γ be a well-formed
typing context, and c0 a IMPE command, c, c′ IMP2E com-
mands, and σ0, σ, σ′ IMP2E memories such that σ0 =
erasure2(σ0) and 〈c0, σ0〉• →∗ 〈c, σ〉• → 〈c′, σ′〉•.
Let τ = 〈c0, σ0〉• . . . 〈c, σ〉•, and let τ ′ = τ〈c′, σ′〉•.
If τ,⊥,Γ ` 〈c, σ〉•config then τ ′,⊥,Γ ` 〈c′, σ′〉•config.
Before we prove Theorem 4, we first state and prove a
series of useful lemmas.
The first two lemmas relate to the program counter policy.
If a program is well-typed for some program counter policy
pc, then it is also well-typed for any weaker program counter
policy, and also, any variable x that is updated in the next
step satisfies ` pc ≤ Γ(x).
Lemma 5 If ` pc ≤ pc′ and τ, pc′,Γ ` c com then
τ, pc,Γ ` c com.
Proof: By induction on τ, pc′,Γ ` c com.
Lemma 6 Let Γ be a well-formed typing context, τ a trace,
i ∈ {1, 2, •}, c, c′ commands, and σ, sigma′ memories such
that 〈c, σ〉i → 〈c′, σ′〉i and τ, pc,Γ ` c com. For all x ∈
Vars , if σ(x) 6= σ′(x) then ` pc ≤ Γ(x).
Moreover, if the execution step assigned some variable y,
then for all x ∈ Vars , if σ(x) 6= σ′(x) then ` Γ(y) ≤ Γ(x).
Proof: By induction on the derivation of 〈c, σ〉i →
〈c′, σ′〉i. The only way the memory can change is by as-
signing some variable y the value (or pair value) v, via the
utility function update(σ, y, v).
If x = y, then the appropriate typing rule (OS-ASSIGN,
OS-DECLASSIFY, or OS-PAIR-DECLASSIFY) requires that
` pc ≤ Γ(y) and Γ(y) = Γ(x). If x 6= y, then, considering
the definition of erasure(σ[y 7→ v]) there must be some k
such that σ′(x) = σk(x) 6= σ(x). By induction on k, we can
show that for any variable z, if σk(z) 6= σ(z), then ` pc ≤
Γ(y) and ` Γ(y) ≤ Γ(z). The base case k = 0 follows from
the typing rules requiring ` pc ≤ Γ(y). The inductive case is
that if ¬reqErase(z, σ) but reqErase(z, σk+1), then there
must be some variable z′ such that σ(z′) 6= σk(z′) = σ′(z′),
z′ appears in an expression in eraseConds(Γ(z)). By the
induction hypothesis, we have ` pc ≤ Γ(y) and ` Γ(y) ≤
Γ(z′). Since Γ is well-formed, we have ` Γ(z′) ≤ Γ(z), and
so ` pc ≤ Γ(y) and ` Γ(y) ≤ Γ(z) as required.
To prove type preservation in IMP2E , it is helpful to know
that IMPE also preserves types.
Lemma 7 (Type preservation for IMPE ) Let Γ be a well-
formed typing context, and c a IMPE command, and σ a
IMPE memory, and pc a policy such that pc,Γ ` c com. For
i ∈ {1, 2}, if 〈c, σ〉i → 〈c′, σ′〉i then pc,Γ ` c′ com.
Proof: By induction on 〈c, σ〉i → 〈c′, σ′〉i, using Lemma 5
applied to IMPE type judgments.
The following series of lemmas are related to showing that
nice properties hold for the utility functions update2(·, ·, ·)
and erasure2(·). Several of them are concerned with mem-
ories σ that satisfy σ = erasure2(σ). We call such mem-
ories consistent, as they are consistent with erasure require-
ments: ∀i ∈ {1, 2}. ∀x ∈ V ars. reqErase(Γ(x), bσci) ⇒
bσ(x)ci = 0.
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The IMP2E utility functions update
2(·, ·, ·) and
erasure2(·) agree with their IMPE versions.
Lemma 8 Let σ and σ′ be IMP2E memories. If σ′ =
update2(σ, x, L v1 | v2 M) for some variable x and values v1
and v2, then for all i ∈ {1, 2}, bσ′ci = update(bσci, x, vi).
Similarly, if σ′ = erasure2(σ), then for all i ∈ {1, 2},
bσ′ci = erasure(bσci)
Proof: Suppose σ′ = update2(σ, x, L v1 | v2 M)
for some variable x and values v1 and v2. Let
σ′i = update(bσci, x, vi). Let y be a variable. If
reqErase(Γ(y), σ′1) and reqErase(Γ(y), σ′2) then
σ′i(y) = 0 = bσ′ci(y) as required. If σ′1(y) = bσc1(y)
and σ′2(y) = bσc2(y) then bσ′(y)ci = bσ(y)ci = σ′i(y)
as required. Otherwise, σ′(y) = Lσ′1(y) |σ′2(y) M, and so
bσ(y)ci = σ′i(y) as required.
Now suppose σ′ = erasure2(σ). Let σ′i =
erasure(bσci). Let y be a variable. If reqErase(Γ(y), σ′1)
and reqErase(Γ(y), σ′2) then σ′i(y) = 0 = bσ′ci(y) as
required. If σ′1(y) = bσc1 and σ′2(y) = bσc2 then
bσ′(y)ci = bσ(y)ci = σ′i(y) as required. Otherwise,
σ′(y) = Lσ′1(y) |σ′2(y) M, and so bσ(y)ci = σ′i(y) as re-
quired.
The utility function update2(·, ·, ·) establishes a consistent
memory.
Lemma 9 Let σ and σ′ be IMP2E memories such that σ′ =
update2(σ, x, w) for some variable x and value w. Then
σ′ = erasure2(σ′)
Proof: Note that for IMPE memories σ0 and σ′0 if σ′0 =
update(σ0, x, v) for some variable x and value v, then σ′0 =
erasure(σ′0). This follows easily from the definition of
update(σ0, x, v) and the idempotency of erasure(·).
Let σ′i = erasure(bσ′ci). We have
σ′i = erasure(bσ′ci)
= erasure(bupdate2(σ, x, w)ci)
= erasure(update(bσci, x, bwci))
= update(bσci, x, bwci).
Let y be a variable. Consider erasure2(σ′)(y). If
∀i ∈ {1, 2}. reqErase(Γ(y), σ′i) then from the definition of
update2(σ, x, w) we have σ′(y) = 0 = erasure2(σ′)(y).
Similarly, if ∃i ∈ {1, 2}. ¬reqErase(Γ(y), σ′i)
and ∃i ∈ {1, 2}. bσci(y) 6= σ′i(y), then
from the definition of update2(σ, x, w) we have
σ′(y) = Lσ′1(y) |σ′2(y) M = erasure2(σ′)(y). Fi-
nally, if ∃i ∈ {1, 2}. ¬reqErase(Γ(y), σ′i) and
∀i ∈ {1, 2}. bσci(y) = σ′i(y), then from the definition of
update2(σ, x, w) we have σ′(y) = σ(y) = erasure2(σ′)(y).
The semantics of IMP2E preserves consistent memories.
Lemma 10 Let Γ be a well-formed typing context, and
c0 a IMPE command, c a IMP2E command, and σ0, σ
IMP2E memories such that σ0 = erasure
2(σ0) and τ =
〈c0, σ0〉• →∗ 〈c, σ〉•. Then σ = erasure2(σ).
Proof: By induction on→. When a step does not change the
memory, this is trivial. For OS-ASSIGN, OS-DECLASSIFY,
and OS-PAIR-DECLASSIFY, the result follows from the
idempotency of erasure2(·). For OS-PAIR-LIFT, it follows
from the idempotency of erasure(·).
For consistent memories σ, a variable x will map to a pair
value in a σ only if the policy Γ(x) does not require erasure
in at least one of the projections. Equivalently, if Γ(x) re-
quires erasure in both projections, then sigma(x) will not
be a pair value.
Lemma 11 For all IMP2E memories σ, and all variables
x ∈ Vars , if σ = erasure2(σ) and σ(x) = L v1 | v2 M, then
¬reqErase(Γ(x), bσci) for some i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof: Immediate from the definition of erasure2(σ).
For consistent memories σ, if there is a variable x that
maps to a pair value, then there is some variable y such that
y also maps to a pair value, Γ(y) does not require erasure in
either projection, and information is allowed to flow from y
to x. The proof of this lemma uses the well-foundedness of
the overwrite dependency relation ≺Γ.
Lemma 12 For any IMP2E memory σ, and variable x, if σ =
erasure2(σ) and σ(x) = L v1 | v2 M, then there is a variable y
such that σ(y) = L v′1 | v′2 M and ¬reqErase(Γ(y), bτci) for
all i ∈ {1, 2} and ` Γ(y) ≤ Γ(x)
Proof: If¬reqErase(Γ(x), bσci) for all i ∈ {1, 2}, then we
are done. If not, then by Lemma 11, ¬reqErase(Γ(x), bσci)
for some i ∈ {1, 2}. This means there is some expression
e ∈ eraseConds(Γ(x)) such that σ(e) is a pair value, and
so there is some variable x0 that appears in e such that σ(x0)
is a pair value. Since Γ is well-formed, we have ` Γ(x0) ≤
Γ(x). Note that x0 ≺Γ x. If ¬reqErase(Γ(x0), bτci)
for all i ∈ {1, 2}, then we are done. Otherwise, we re-
peat the argument, forming a chain x0, x1, . . . such that
xk+1 ≺Γ xk and ` Γ(xk+1) ≤ Γ(xk). Since Γ is well-
formed, the relation≺Γ is well-founded, and thus eventually
a variable xn will be found such that σ(xn) is a pair value
and ¬reqErase(Γ(xn), bτci) for all i ∈ {1, 2}.
The next two lemmas are concerned with the preserva-
tion of predicates protected(p, τ) and ¬reqErase(p, bτci)
when the trace τ is extended. The first claims that if τ is
extended by one step to τ ′ but the memory is not changed in
that step, then protected(p, τ) implies protected(p, τ ′). The
second lemma claims that if a IMP2E command c is well-
typed for a trace τ , and trace τ ′ satisfies all protected(·, ·)
and ¬reqErase(·, ·) predicates that τ does, then c is well-
typed for τ ′.
Lemma 13 Let Γ be a well-formed typing context, and
c0, c IMPE commands, and σ0, σ IMP2E memories such that
σ0 = erasure2(σ0) and 〈c0, σ0〉• →∗ 〈c, σ〉•. Suppose
〈c, σ〉• → 〈c′, σ〉•. Let τ = 〈c0, σ0〉• . . . 〈c, σ〉•, and let
τ ′ = τ〈c′, σ〉•. Then for all policies p, if protected(p, τ)
then protected(p, τ ′).
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Proof: Suppose protected(p, τ). We need to show that ei-
ther ¬reqErase(p, bτ ′c1) or ¬reqErase(p, bτ ′c2) and that
for i ∈ {1, 2} if ¬reqErase(p, bσci) then Γ(x) ≤bτ ′ci p.
First note that the final memories of τ and τ ′ are
identical, and so ¬reqErase(p, bτci) if and only if
¬reqErase(p, bτ ′ci).
Since protected(p, τ), either ¬reqErase(p, bτc1) or
¬reqErase(p, bτc2), and so either ¬reqErase(p, bτ ′c1) or
¬reqErase(p, bτ ′c2).
Suppose for some i we have ¬reqErase(p, bτ ′ci). Then
¬reqErase(p, bτci), and since protected(p, τ), Γ(x) ≤bτci
p. By the inference rules for extended relabeling, we can
conclude protected(p, τ ′).
Lemma 14 Let τ and τ ′ be IMP2E traces, Γ a well-
formed context, pc a policy, and c a IMP2E com-
mand such that τ, pc,Γ ` c com. If for all poli-
cies p we have protected(p, τ) ⇒ protected(p, τ ′)
and ¬reqErase(p, bτci) ⇒ ¬reqErase(p, bτ ′ci), then
τ ′, pc,Γ ` c com.
Proof: By induction on the derivation of τ, pc,Γ ` c com,
the only interesting case being T-PAIR.
Pair commands are introduced into a configuration only
when an if command is executed, and the conditional ex-
pression evaluates to a pair value. This restricts where pair
commands may appear.
Lemma 15 Let Γ be a well-formed context, c a IMPE com-
mand, and σ a IMP2E memory. For any configuration
〈c′, σ′〉• such that 〈c, σ〉• →∗ 〈c′, σ′〉•, and any sequence
d0; d1 that is a sub-command of c′, the command d1 does not
contain any pair commands.
Proof: By induction on 〈c, σ〉• →∗ 〈c′, σ′〉•.
Using these lemmas, we can now prove that IMP2E pre-
serves typing.
Proof of Theorem 4: Proof is by induction on the judgment
〈d, σ〉• → 〈d′, σ′〉•. Let τ = 〈c0, σ0〉• . . . 〈c, σ〉•, and let
τ ′ = τ〈c′, σ′〉•. Note that by Lemma 10, we have σ =
erasure2(σ) and σ′ = erasure2(σ′).
• OS-SKIP. Here d = skip; d′. Since the memory
is unchanged, by Lemma 13 and Lemma 14 we have
τ ′,⊥,Γ ` d′ com.
• OS-ASSIGN. Here d = y := e and d′ =
skip. By the typing rule for skip, we have
τ ′,⊥,Γ ` d′ com. We need to show that ∀z ∈
Vars. (σ′(z) = L v1 | v2 M) ⇒ protected(Γ(z), τ ′).
Let z be a variable such that σ′(z) = L v1 | v2 M.
By Lemma 11, either ¬reqErase(Γ(z), bτ ′c1) or
¬reqErase(Γ(z), bτ ′c2). We now just need to show
that for i ∈ {1, 2}, if ¬reqErase(Γ(z), bτ ′ci) then
Γ(x) ≤bτ ′ci Γ(z), where x is the input variable. Sup-
pose ¬reqErase(Γ(z), bτ ′ci).
First, suppose σ(z) = σ′(z). If
¬reqErase(Γ(z), bτci), then, by the inference
rules for the extended relabeling relation, we can
conclude that Γ(x) ≤bτ ′ci Γ(z), and we are done.
Otherwise reqErase(Γ(z), bτci), and so by Lemma 11
and Lemma 12, there is a variable w such that σ(w)
is a pair value and ¬reqErase(Γ(w), bτci) and
` Γ(w) ≤ Γ(z). Since τ, pc,Γ ` 〈c, σ〉• config, we
have protected(Γ(w), τ), and so Γ(x) ≤bτci Γ(w), and
thus, by the inference rules for the extended relabeling
relation, Γ(x) ≤bτ ′ci Γ(z) as required.
Otherwise, σ(z) 6= σ′(z) and so either z = y, or z was
updated by the utility function erasure(·).
If z = y, then σ(e) is a pair value, since σ′(z) is a
pair value. Thus there must be a variable w that ap-
pears in e such that σ(w) is a pair, and ` Γ(w) ≤ Γ(z)
(by the typing rule for assignment). By Lemma 12,
there is a variable w′ such that σ(w′) is a pair value
and ¬reqErase(Γ(w′), bτci) and ` Γ(w′) ≤ Γ(w) and
` Γ(w) ≤ Γ(z). Since τ, pc,Γ ` 〈c, σ〉• config, we
have protected(Γ(w′), τ), and so Γ(x) ≤bτci Γ(w′),
and thus, by the inference rules for the extended rela-
beling relation, Γ(x) ≤bτ ′ci Γ(z) as required.
Finally, if σ(z) 6= σ′(z) and z 6= y, then z was up-
dated by the utility function erasure(·). Note that this
means Γ(z) requires erasure on at least one of the two
projections. By Lemma 12, there is a variable w such
that σ(w) is a pair value and ¬reqErase(Γ(w), bτc1)
and ¬reqErase(Γ(w), bτc2) and ` Γ(w) ≤ Γ(z).
Since Γ(w) does not require erasure in either projection,
w was not updated by the utility function erasure(·).
Thus, by the previous cases, we have Γ(x) ≤bτ ′ci
Γ(w), and thus Γ(x) ≤bτ ′ci Γ(z) as required.
• OS-SEQUENCE. Here d = d1; d2 and d′ = d′1; d2. By
the inductive hypothesis, we have τ ′,⊥,Γ ` d′1 com,
and that ∀x ∈ Vars. (σ′(x) = L v1 | v2 M) ⇒
protected(Γ(x), τ ′). We need to show that τ ′,⊥,Γ `
d2 com. We do this by an easy induction on the deriva-
tion of τ,⊥,Γ ` d2 com which relies on the fact
that, by Lemma 15, the command d2 cannot contain
a command pair L d3 | d4 M. Thus we have τ ′,⊥,Γ `
〈d′1; d2, σ′〉• config as required.
• OS-IF. Here d = if e then d0 else d1 and d′ = di
for some i ∈ {0, 1}. By the typing rule for if, and
Lemma 5, we have τ,⊥,Γ ` d′ com. Since the mem-
ory is unchanged, by Lemma 13 and Lemma 14 we have
τ ′,⊥,Γ ` d′ com.
• OS-WHILE. Here d = while e do d1 and d′ =
ifethend1; whileedod1elseskip. Since τ,⊥,Γ ` dcom,
we have Γ ` e : pe exp, and there exists some pol-
icy pc′ such that ` ⊥ ≤ pc′, and ` pe ≤ pc′, and
τ, pc′,Γ ` d1 com. From this we can derive τ, pc′,Γ `
while e do d1 com, and thus τ, pc′,Γ ` d′ com, and
so by Lemma 5, we have τ,⊥,Γ ` d′ com. Since the
memory is unchanged, by Lemma 13 and Lemma 14
we have τ ′,⊥,Γ ` d′ com.
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• OS-DECLASSIFY. Here d = y :=
declassify(e, pf to pt using e0, . . . , ek) and d′ = skip.
By the typing rule for skip, we have τ ′,⊥,Γ ` d′ com.
We need to show that ∀z ∈ Vars. (σ′(z) =L v1 | v2 M) ⇒ protected(Γ(z), τ ′). Let z be a variable
such that σ′(z) = L v1 | v2 M. By Lemma 11, either
¬reqErase(Γ(z), bτ ′c1) or ¬reqErase(Γ(z), bτ ′c2).
We now just need to show that for i ∈ {1, 2}, if
¬reqErase(Γ(z), bτ ′ci) then Γ(x) ≤bτ ′ci Γ(z).
Suppose ¬reqErase(Γ(z), bτ ′ci).
First, suppose σ(z) = σ′(z). The reasoning is exactly
the same as the analogous subcase in OS-ASSIGN.
Otherwise, σ(z) 6= σ′(z) and so either z = y, or z was
updated by the utility function erasure(·).
If z = y, then σ(e) is a pair value, since σ′(z) is a pair
value. (This implies that all conditions ei were satisfied,
as otherwise, z is updated with the non-pair value 0.)
The reasoning in this case is exactly the same as the
analogous subcase in OS-ASSIGN.
Finally, if σ(z) 6= σ′(z) and z 6= y, then z was updated
by the utility function erasure(·). The reasoning here
is exactly the same as the analogous subcase in OS-
ASSIGN.
• OS-PAIR-SKIP. Immediate by typing rule for skip.
• OS-PAIR-LIFT. Here d = L d1 | d2 M and d′ =L d′1 | d′2 M. If σ′ = σ, then by Lemma 13, we have
τ ′,⊥,Γ ` d′ com. So suppose σ′ 6= σ.
Since τ,⊥,Γ ` d com, there is a pc′ such that
protected(pc′, τ), ¬reqErase(pc′, τ), and pc′,Γ `
di com, for i ∈ {1, 2}. By Lemma 7, we have
pc′,Γ ` d′i com, for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Without loss of generality, assume that it is the left ex-
ecution that makes progress, and thus d2 = d′2. Note
that since the left projection made progress, the right
projection was unchanged, and so bσ′c2 = bσc2, and
thus ¬reqErase(pc′, bσ′c2).
If ¬reqErase(pc′, bσ′c1), then we can easily show that
protected(pc′, τ ′), and so we have τ ′,⊥,Γ ` d′ com,
as required.
Otherwise, suppose reqErase(pc′, bσ′c1). Since
σ′ 6= σ, there must have been either an assign-
ment or a declassification, updating some variable y.
By the definition of update(·, ·, ·), this means that
¬reqErase(Γ(y), bτc1), and by the well-formedness
of Γ, ¬reqErase(Γ(y), bτ ′c1) (since whether Γ(y) re-
quires erasure cannot depend on y). By Lemma 6,
` pc′ ≤ Γ(y). Since ¬reqErase(pc′, bσc1) but
reqErase(pc′, bσ′c1), there is a variable y′ such that
bσ′c1(y′) 6= bσc1(y′), and there is an expression e ∈
eraseConds(pc′) such that y′ appears in e, and either
y = y′ or y can affect whether Γ(y′) requires erasure,
that is (y, y′) is in the transitive closure of the overwrite
dependency relation ≺Γ. From the well-formedness of
Γ, we have ` Γ(y) ≤ Γ(y′), and since Γ ` pc′ pol,
` Γ(y′) ≤ pc′, and thus ` Γ(y) ≤ pc′.
Since σ′(y) is a pair value, by Lemma 12,
there is a variable w such that σ′(w) is a
pair value and ¬reqErase(Γ(w), bτ ′c1) and
¬reqErase(Γ(w), bτ ′c2) and ` Γ(w) ≤ Γ(y).
If ` Γ(y) ≤ Γ(w), then ` pc′ ≤ Γ(w), and so
Γ(x) ≤bτ ′ci Γ(w), and so protected(Γ(w), τ ′). If
Γ(y) 6v Γ(w), then by Lemma 6, σ(w) = σ′(w), and so
¬reqErase(Γ(w), bτc1) and ¬reqErase(Γ(w), bτc2).
Because τ, pc,Γ ` 〈c, σ〉• config, we have
protected(Γ(w), τ), and using the inference rules
for the extended relabeling relation, we can show that
protected(Γ(w), τ ′). Moreover, by Lemma 5, we have
τ,Γ(w),Γ ` d′1 com and τ,Γ(w),Γ ` d′2 com. Thus,
τ ′,⊥,Γ ` d′ com.
We also need to show that for any variable z ∈
Vars , if σ′(z) = L v1 | v2 M then protected(Γ(z), τ ′).
Let z be a variable such that σ′(z) is a pair value.
By Lemma 11, either ¬reqErase(Γ(z), bτ ′c1) or
¬reqErase(Γ(z), bτ ′c2). We now just need to show
that for i ∈ {1, 2}, if ¬reqErase(Γ(z), bτ ′ci) then
Γ(x) ≤bτ ′ci Γ(z). Suppose ¬reqErase(Γ(z), bτ ′ci).
Suppose σ(z) = σ′(z). If ¬reqErase(Γ(z), bτci) we
are done. Otherwise reqErase(Γ(z), bτci), and so by
Lemma 11 and Lemma 12, there is a variable w such
that σ(w) is a pair value and ¬reqErase(Γ(w), bτci)
and ` Γ(w) ≤ Γ(z). Since τ, pc,Γ ` 〈c, σ〉• config,
we have Γ(x) ≤bτci Γ(w), and thus Γ(x) ≤bτ ′ci Γ(z)
as required.
Otherwise, σ(z) 6= σ′(z) and so bσc1(z) 6= bσ′c1(z),
and since τ, pc′,Γ ` d1 com, by Lemma 6 we have
` pc′ ≤ Γ(z). Thus Γ(x) ≤bτ ′c1 Γ(z) as required.
• OS-PAIR-IF. Here d = if e then d0 else d1 and
d′ = L d′1 | d′2 M. Since σ(e) = L v1 | v2 M, there
is at least one variable y that appears in e such
that σ(y) is a pair value. By Lemma 12, there
is a variable w such that σ(w) is a pair value and
¬reqErase(Γ(w), bτc1) and ¬reqErase(Γ(w), bτc2)
and ` Γ(w) ≤ Γ(y) and ` Γ(y) ≤ pe. There-
fore, by Lemma 5, we have Γ(w),Γ ` d′1 com and
Γ(w),Γ ` d′2 com. Since τ, pc,Γ ` 〈c, σ〉• config,
we have protected(Γ(w), τ), and by Lemma 13,
protected(Γ(w), τ ′) and ¬reqErase(Γ(w), bσ′c1) and
¬reqErase(Γ(w), bσ′c2). Thus, τ ′,⊥,Γ ` d′ com.
• OS-PAIR-DECLASSIFY. This case is sim-
ilar to OS-ASSIGN. Here d = y :=
declassify(e, pf to pt using e0, . . . , ek) and d′ = skip.
By the typing rule for skip, we have τ ′,⊥,Γ ` d′ com.
We need to show that ∀z ∈ Vars. (σ′(z) =L v1 | v2 M) ⇒ protected(Γ(z), τ ′). Let z be a variable
such that σ′(z) is a pair value. By Lemma 11, either
¬reqErase(Γ(z), bτ ′c1) or ¬reqErase(Γ(z), bτ ′c2).
We now just need to show that for i ∈ {1, 2}, if
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¬reqErase(Γ(z), bτ ′ci) then Γ(x) ≤bτ ′ci Γ(z).
Suppose ¬reqErase(Γ(z), bτ ′ci).
Suppose σ(z) = σ′(z). If ¬reqErase(Γ(z), bτci) we
are done. Otherwise reqErase(Γ(z), bτci), and so by
Lemma 11 and Lemma 12, there is a variable w such
that σ(w) is a pair value and ¬reqErase(Γ(w), bτc1)
and ¬reqErase(Γ(w), bτc2) and ` Γ(w) ≤ Γ(z).
Since τ, pc,Γ ` 〈c, σ〉• config, we have Γ(x) ≤bτci
Γ(w), and thus Γ(x) ≤bτ ′ci Γ(z) as required.
Otherwise, σ(z) 6= σ′(z) and so either z = y, or z was
updated by the utility function erasure(·).
Suppose z = y. Since σ(e0 × · · · × ek) is a
pair value, there must be a variable w that appears
in e0 × · · · × ek such that σ(w) is a pair, and `
Γ(w) ≤ Γ(z) (by the typing rule for declassifica-
tion). By Lemma 12, there is a variable w′ such that
σ(w′) is a pair value and ¬reqErase(Γ(w′), bτc1) and
¬reqErase(Γ(w′), bτc2) and ` Γ(w′) ≤ Γ(w) and
` Γ(w) ≤ Γ(z). Since τ, pc,Γ ` 〈c, σ〉• config, we
have Γ(x) ≤bτci Γ(w′), and thus Γ(x) ≤bτ ′ci Γ(z) as
required.
Finally, if σ(z) 6= σ′(z) and z 6= y, then z was updated
by the utility function erasure(·). Note that this means
Γ(z) requires erasure on at least one of the two projec-
tions. By Lemma 12, there is a variable w such that
σ(w) is a pair value and ¬reqErase(Γ(w), bτc1) and
¬reqErase(Γ(w), bτc2) and ` Γ(w) ≤ Γ(z). Since
Γ(w) does not require erasure on either projection,
w was not updated by the utility function erasure(·).
Thus, by the previous cases, we have Γ(x) ≤bτci Γ(w),
and thus Γ(x) ≤bτ ′ci Γ(z) as required.
Using the type preservation property of IMP2E , we are now
ready to prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2: Let v1, v2 ∈ Z, let σ be a IMPE
memory. Let σ0 = update2(σ, x, L v1 | v2 M). By Lemma 10,
σ0 = erasure2(σ0). Let τ1 and τ2 be traces such that τi[0] =
〈c, bσ0ci〉.
By Lemma 3 and Lemma 1, there is a IMP2E trace τ such
that bτci is a prefix of τi for all i ∈ {1, 2}, and for some
i ∈ {1, 2}, bτci = τi.
We construct a correspondence R for τ1 and τ2 such
that R is the smallest set such that for all k ∈ 1..|τ |,
(f1(τ [..k]), f2(τ [..k])) ∈ R, where fi(τ ′) is the number of
reduction steps of the IMP2E execution τ
′ that reduce the ith
projection. Thus, if (i, j) ∈ R, then there is some k such that
bτ [k]c1 = τ1[i] and bτ [k]c2 = τ2[j].
Let ` ∈ L, and let (i, j) ∈ R. There is some k such
that bτ [k]c1 = τ1[i] and bτ [k]c2 = τ2[j]. Let τ [k] =
〈ck, σk〉•. Note that τ1[i] = 〈bckc1, bσkc1〉 and τ2[j] =
〈bckc2, bσkc2〉.
Suppose for some variable y, bσkc1(y) 6= bσkc2(y).
Then σk(y) = L v1 | v2 M. By Theorem 4, we
have τ [..k],⊥,Γ ` 〈ck, σk〉• config. Therefore,
protected(Γ(y), τ [..k]). Thus, either Γ(x) ≤τ1[..i]
Γ(y) or Γ(x) ≤τ2[..j] Γ(y). By Property 2 and
Lemma 8, either (τ1[i],obs(Γ(y))) ∈ [[Γ(x)]]update(σ,x,v1)
or (τ2[j],obs(Γ(y))) ∈ [[Γ(x)]]update(σ,x,v2). Therefore,
we have if (τ1[i], `) 6∈ [[Γ(x)]]update(σ,x,v1) and (τ2[j], `) 6∈
[[Γ(x)]]update(σ,x,v2), then τ1[i] ≈` τ2[j], and so, c is nonin-
terfering according to policy for variable x.
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